

1 CAROL C. LAM
United States Attorney
2 TOM STAHL (California Bar No. 078291)
Assistant U.S. Attorney
3 U.S. Attorney's Office
Federal Office Building
4 880 Front Street, Room 6293
San Diego, California 92101-8893
5 Telephone: (619) 557-7140

6 THOMAS L. SANSONETTI
Assistant Attorney General
7 ANDREW A. SMITH (New Mexico Bar No. 8341)
United States Department of Justice
8 Environment & Natural Resources Division
c/o United States Attorney's Office
9 P.O. Box 607
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103
10 Telephone: (505) 224-1468
BRIAN C. TOTH (Virginia Bar No. 48843)
11 United States Department of Justice
Environment & Natural Resources Division
12 P.O. Box 663
Washington, D.C. 20044-0663
13 Telephone: (202) 305-0639

14 **Attorneys for Federal Defendants**

15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

16 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

17 BORDER POWER PLANT) Civ. No. 02-0513-IEG (POR)
18 WORKING GROUP,)
Plaintiff,) **FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM**
19 v.) **OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT**
20) **OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, et al.,) **AND**
21) **OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION**
Federal Defendants.) **FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**^{1/}
22)
23) Date: April 18, 2003
24) Time: 9:00 a.m.
Courtroom 13, 5th Floor
The Honorable Irma E. Gonzalez

25
26
27 ^{1/} NOTE TO THE CLERK: Pursuant to direction from the Honorable Irma E. Gonzalez on March 6, 2002, Federal Defendants file this combined memorandum in support of their motion for summary and opposition to Plaintiff's January 31, 2003 motion for summary judgment with a page limit of 40 pages. A stipulated order allowing this combined motion/opposition is submitted herewith.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii

LIST OF ACRONYMS vii

INTRODUCTION 1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2

I. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS BY DOE AND BLM 2

II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CHALLENGED TRANSMISSION LINES AND THE GENERATING FACILITIES 3

LEGAL BACKGROUND 7

I. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 7

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT ... 8

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 10

ARGUMENT 11

I. IN COMPLIANCE WITH ANY OBLIGATIONS UNDER NEPA, DOE AND BLM TOOK A REASONABLE “HARD LOOK” AT THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED ACTIONS 11

A. The EA Adequately Addressed Potential Impacts to Air Quality in the Salton Sea Air Basin 11

1. The Effect On NO_x, CO, and PM₁₀ Will Not Be Significant 11

2. Emissions Were Accurately Estimated 12

3. Other Air Quality Effects Were Adequately Considered 14

B. The EA Adequately Addressed Potential Effects on Water Quality and the Salton Sea 15

C. The EA Addresses A Reasonable Range Of Alternatives For The Proposed Actions 18

II. DOE AND BLM REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT THE TRANSMISSION LINE PROJECTS DO NOT REQUIRE AN EIS 24

A. Potential Effects Of The Proposed Action Is Not Highly Controversial ... 25

B. The Potential Effects On Ozone Were Considered And Thoroughly

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Addressed 29

**C. The Project Does Not Threaten To Violate Local, State, Or
Federal Laws Meant To Protect Air Quality** 32

D. The Project Will Not Result In Cumulatively Significant Impacts 34

E. Health Impacts Were Adequately Considered 34

CONCLUSION 36

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) 8, 25

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) 10

Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998). 8

Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 8

Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) 10

Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 20

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) 28

City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1986) 14, 21

City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1997) 9, 20

City of New York v. DOT, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983) 22

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729 (1985) 10

Found. for North American Wild Sheep v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172
(9th Cir. 1982) 35

Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985) 9, 29

Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975) 21

Friends of the Earth v. Heintz, 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986) 19

Friends of the Ompompanoosuc v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1549 (2d Cir. 1992) 23

Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1332, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992) 25, 28

Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 760 (D. Haw. 1990) 21

Headwaters, Inc. v. BLM, 914 F.2d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 1990) 22

Hells Canyon Alliance v. U.S. Forest Serv., 227 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2000) 31

Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992) 9

Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 2000) 23

Johnston v. Davis, 698 F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 1983) 15

1 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) 9

2 Laguna Greenbelt Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 42 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1999) 9, 12

3 Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973) 22

4 Lodge Tower Cond. Ass’n v. Lodge Properties, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Colo. 1995) 10

5 Louisiana Wildlife Federation v. York, 761 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1985) 20

6 Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) 7, 9

7 Missouri Mining, Inc. v. ICC, 33 F.3d 980 (8th Cir. 1994) 24

8 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Federal Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998) . . 8

9 Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 177 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1999) 19

10 National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973) 15

11 National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001) 25, 26, 29

12 Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2002) 8

13 NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993) 1, 21

14 Northern Plains Resource Council v. Lujan, 874 F.2d 661(9th Cir. 1989) 23

15 Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520
 (9th Cir. 1997) 19

16 Northwest Motorcycle Assn. v. U.S. Dept. of Ag., 18 F.3d 1468 (9th Cir. 1994) 10

17 Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. Dept. of Agriculture, 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987) . . . 7

18 Presidio Golf Club v. National Park Service, 155 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 1998) 20

19 Public Citizen v. Department of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2003) 25, 26, 28, 35

20 River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of U.S. Army, 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985) . . 7

21 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) 7, 23

22 Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1994) 7, 8, 31

23 Seattle Audubon Society v. Mosely, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996) 22

24 Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1994) 23

25 Sierra Club v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1991) 14

26

27

1 Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Service, 46 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 1995) 15

2 Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974) 19

3 United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963) 10

4 United States v. Southern Florida Water Management Dist., 28 F.3d 1563, 1573
 (11th Cir. 1994) 14

5 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
 6 435 U.S. 519 (1978) 7, 9, 14, 19

7 Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) 8, 13

8 **STATUTES**

9 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 *et seq.* 10

10 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 *et seq.* 2, 8

11 5 U.S.C. § 706 10

12 42 U.S.C. § 4321 *et seq.* 1

13 42 U.S.C. § 4321 7

14 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 7, 24

15 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) 34-35

16 **REGULATIONS**

17 10 C.F.R. § 205.320(a) 2

18 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(b)(1) 30

19 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(b)(2) 11, 34

20 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) 7

21 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 7

22 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 24

23 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) 24, 25

24 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) 25

25 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(10) 33

26

1 **FEDERAL RULES**

2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 2, 10

3 **EXECUTIVE ORDERS**

4 Executive Order 10485, 18 Fed. Reg. 5397 (Sept. 3, 1953) 2

5 Executive Order 12038, 43 Fed. Reg. 4957 (Feb. 3, 1978) 2

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

LIST OF ACRONYMS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

APA	Administrative Procedure Act
APCD	Air Pollution Control District
AFPY	Acre-feet per year
BACT	Best Available Control Technology
BCP	Baja California Power, Inc.
BLM	U.S. Department of Interior Bureau of Land Management
BOD	Biological Oxygen Demand
CO	Carbon Monoxide
COD	Chemical Oxygen Demand
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EA	Environmental Assessment
EAX	Energía Azteca X, S. de R.L. de C.V.
EBC	Energía de Baja California
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FONSI	Finding of no significant impact
IV	Imperial Valley
LRPC	La Rosita Power Complex
mg/m ³	Micrograms per cubic meter
MW	Megawatt
NAAQS	National Ambient Air Quality Standards
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NO ₂	Nitrogen dioxide
NO	Nitric oxide
NO _x	NO + NO ₂ + other oxides of nitrogen
O ₃	Ozone
PM ₁₀	Particulate matter (less than 10 microns in size)
PPM	Parts per million
PPY	Pounds per year
ROW	Right-of-way
SCR	Selective catalytic reduction
SER	Sempra Energy Resources
SL	Significance level
TDM	Termoeléctrica de Mexicali
TDS	Total Dissolved Solids
TSS	Total Suspended Solids
VOC	Volatile organic carbon compound

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 In its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asserts that the Department of Energy
3 (“DOE”) violated various requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42
4 U.S.C. § 4321 *et seq.*, when the agency issued two Presidential Permits allowing the construction
5 and operation of power lines for the movement of electricity from two power plants in Mexicali,
6 Mexico across the international border into the United States near El Centro, California. Plaintiff
7 argues that the environmental assessment (“EA”) that DOE prepared in cooperation with the
8 Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) (which provided the necessary rights-of-way for the power
9 lines) did not sufficiently address the water and air impacts of the proposed Presidential Permits,
10 and should have considered alternatives conditioning the Permits on stringent requirements on the
11 power plants in Mexico to reduce the alleged water and air impacts. Plaintiff also contends that
12 the environmental impacts from issuing these Presidential Permits are “significant,” and that
13 therefore NEPA required DOE to complete a more detailed environmental impact statement
14 (“EIS”).^{2/}

15 Plaintiff’s claims must fail. DOE completed a detailed EA--supported by an extensive
16 Administrative Record--that thoroughly examines the potential environmental effects of issuing the
17 Presidential Permits. Although Plaintiff may disagree with the methods DOE used to assess
18 environmental impacts and with DOE’s conclusion that the potential environmental impacts are
19 not significant,^{3/} it has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that DOE’s conclusion was not
20

21 ^{2/} Plaintiff’s NEPA challenges focus exclusively on potential effects of the project within the
22 United States, as they must, because NEPA does not apply to potential actions and effects located
23 outside the United States. See, e.g., NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466
(D.D.C. 1993).

24 ^{3/} As addressed in Federal Defendants’ accompanying motion to strike and below, Plaintiff has
25 improperly filed a number of declarations in support of its arguments concerning DOE’s
26 methodologies and conclusions. These materials are not part of the Administrative Record on
27 which this Court must base its review of Plaintiff’s claims and, even if they were, they do not
establish that DOE did not take the requisite “hard look” at the potential environmental impacts of
issuing the Presidential Permits in accordance with NEPA.

1 based on a sufficient assessment of the relevant environmental impacts or that the agency's
2 conclusion was not reasonable. On the contrary, the exhaustive analysis evidenced in the EA and
3 multi-volume Administrative Record lodged with the Court demonstrate that DOE (and BLM)
4 fulfilled, and likely exceeded, their obligations under NEPA for a project with such minimal
5 environmental impacts.

6 As discussed below, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that DOE's "finding of no
7 significant impact" was "arbitrary and capricious," as Plaintiff is required to do pursuant to the
8 judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 *et seq.*,
9 nor can it make such a showing. Therefore, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,
10 Federal Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny Plaintiff's motion for summary
11 judgment and grant summary judgment in favor of Federal Defendants.

12 **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

13 **I. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS BY DOE AND BLM**

14 In February and March, 2001, Baja California Power, Inc. ("BCP") and Sempra Energy
15 Resources ("SER") each submitted applications to the DOE for Presidential Permits^{4/} to construct
16 and operate electric power transmission lines across the international border between the United
17 States and Mexico, near El Centro, California.^{5/} DOE-101, 204322. The transmission lines
18 would be constructed from the Imperial Valley ("IV") Substation, California, to the United
19 States/Mexico international border and would traverse approximately six miles of federal land
20 managed by BLM. DOE-101, 204318. Both lines would run parallel to and within 240 feet of an
21

22 ^{4/} Because the proposed project would involve the operation of "an electric power transmission or
23 distribution facility crossing the border of the United States, for the transmission of electric energy
24 between the United States and a foreign country," SER and BCP were required to obtain such
25 permits prior to constructing the transmission lines. See 10 C.F.R. § 205.320(a); see also
26 Executive Order 10485, 18 Fed. Reg. 5397 (Sept. 3, 1953), amended by Executive Order 12038,
43 Fed. Reg. 4957 (Feb. 3, 1978) (authorizing the Secretary of Energy to issue such permits).

27 ^{5/} Around the same time, BCP and SER each submitted applications to BLM for rights-of-way
("ROWS") on which to construct the transmission lines. DOE-101, 204322. BLM, therefore,
was a cooperating agency on the EA issued by DOE. Id. at 204324.

1 existing transmission line, owned and operated by San Diego Gas and Electric Company under a
2 separate Presidential Permit issued in 1983. Id.

3 Prior to the issuance of these Presidential Permits, DOE and BLM prepared a 135-page
4 environmental assessment (“EA”) with an additional 147 pages in seven appendices that
5 considered the potential environmental effects of the transmission lines. See generally DOE-101,
6 DOE-102. In addition to analyzing direct impacts at the site of the transmission lines, DOE also
7 considered potential impacts to the United States which might result from two power generating
8 facilities planned to be constructed in Mexico and connected to the transmission lines: (1) the La
9 Rosita Power Complex (“LRPC”), which will contain turbines owned and operated by Energía
10 Azteca X, S. de R.L. de C.V. (“EAX”) and Energía de Baja California (“EBC”), subsidiaries of
11 InterGen, Inc. (“Intergen”); and (2) the Termoeléctrica de Mexicali (“TDM”) Facility, which is
12 owned and operated by TDM , a subsidiary of SER.

13 After considering potential impacts detailed in the EA, DOE and BLM each issued a
14 Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”) in December 2001. See generally DOE-103; BLM -
15 182 (FONSI for BCP ROW); BLM 183 (FONSI for SER ROW). DOE issued the Presidential
16 Permits to BCP and SER on December 5, 2001. DOE-104, 204612; DOE-105, 204618. BLM
17 granted a ROW to BCP which became effective on December 28, 2001. BLM-189, 102333. The
18 ROW conveyed to SER became effective on December 31, 2001. BLM-186, 102290. The
19 Presidential Permit and ROW for SER were subsequently transferred to Termoeléctrica U.S. (“T-
20 U.S.”) in the fall of 2002. DOE-129S, S204904, S204907; BLM-210S, S102618.

21 **II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CHALLENGED TRANSMISSION LINES**
22 **AND THE GENERATING FACILITIES**

23 The transmission lines permitted by DOE’s Presidential Permits and BLM’s ROWs
24 connect to two electric generating plants being constructed in Mexico.^{6/} The SER line connects

25
26 ^{6/} Since the issuance of the Presidential Permits and ROWs, construction of the transmission lines
has been completed and the lines are currently operational.

1 with a transmission line constructed in Mexico by TDM, which in turn connects to the TDM
2 facility approximately three miles south of the international border. DOE-35, 202187; DOE-101,
3 204318, 204320. The TDM facility consists of two gas-fired General Electric Model 7FA
4 combustion turbines dedicated to exporting 600 MW of total power to the United States.
5 Electrical power will be exported from the TDM facility by transmitting it along the TDM line to
6 the border, then along the SER (now T-U.S.) line to the IV Substation. DOE-101, 204320.

7 The TDM facility will use emission control technology and would be equipped with dry
8 low-NO_x combustor technology to minimize NO_x and CO emissions. DOE-101, 204402. The
9 TDM facility would also be equipped with selective catalytic reduction and oxidizing catalyst
10 systems to further reduce NO_x and CO emissions, respectively. DOE-101, 204402. The TDM
11 facility is proposed to have emissions rates of 2.5 parts per million (“ppm”) for NO_x and 4.0 for
12 CO. DOE-101, 204402. These emission levels are the same as those being routinely permitted in
13 the United States and specifically in California. Id. Annual emissions from the TDM facility of
14 NO₂, CO, and PM₁₀ would be 170 tons, 165 tons, and 216 tons, respectively. Id. at 204401.

15 The BCP line connects with a transmission line being constructed in Mexico by EBC,
16 which itself connects to the LRPC. The LRPC will be geographically separate from the TDM
17 facility and will contain four gas-fired Siemens-Westinghouse Model 501F combustion turbines:
18 one owned by EBC and three owned by EAX. Two EAX turbines, totaling approximately 500
19 MW, will provide power to the Mexican market, while a third EAX turbine and the single EBC
20 turbine will export up to 560 MW of power to the United States. Id. at 204320. This power will
21 be transmitted from the LRPC along the EBC transmission line to the border, then along the BCP
22 line to the IV Substation. Id.

23 The EBC turbine and the EAX export turbine utilize dry low-NO_x combustor technology
24 to reduce NO₂ emissions. DOE-101, 204402. The EBC turbine and the EAX export turbine
25 utilize selective catalytic reduction technology that would further reduce NO_x emissions to
26 approximately 4 ppm. DOE-101, 20404. These levels are below the Mexican standards (Norma

1 Official Mexicana – 085) of 139 ppm, and the World Bank’s latest guidelines (published in July
2 1998) for new power plants, which are 155 ppm. Id. The CO emissions would be 30 ppm.
3 Annual emissions from the EBC turbine and the EAX export turbine, both dedicated to providing
4 power to the U.S., would be 282 tons of NO₂, 924 tons of CO, and 410 tons of PM₁₀. Id. at
5 204401. Annual emissions from the two EAX turbines used to generate power for Mexico only
6 were listed in the EA as up to 1,502 tons of NO₂, 957 tons of CO, and 314 tons of PM₁₀.^{2/} Id.

7 As part of the cooling process, both the TDM facility and the LRPC will withdraw, treat,
8 and recycle water from the Zaragoza lagoons, which are located west of Mexicali, Mexico. DOE-
9 101, 204394. The primary source of water entering the Zaragoza lagoons is residential sewage.
10 Id. at 204393. Ordinarily, these lagoons discharge into a drain, which in turn discharges into the
11 New River. Id. As a result of this, New River carries biological pathogens, industrial
12 contaminants (trace metals and VOCs), and agricultural waste such as unwanted nutrients and
13 pesticides. Id. at 204394.

14 The LRPC has begun construction of a sewage treatment plant to process the wastewater
15 it will need for power generation. Id. at 204430. The plant will treat the raw sewage from the
16 lagoons via a “screening, degritting, degreasing, biological treatment by way of an extended
17 aeration activated sludge process, nitrification-denitirification, final clarification, and disinfection.”
18 Id. The resulting water will then be piped to the LRPC, where it will be further treated to reduce
19 phosphates, organics, and heavy metals. Id. After the water is treated, it will be used by the
20 facility, recovered, and discharged into drains which ultimately flow to the New River. Id.

21 Treatment at the LRPC will result in a net reduction of pollutants currently discharged into
22 the New River. The weight of total dissolved solids (“TDS”), a measure of salinity, will be
23 reduced at the LRPC by 3.5 million pounds per year (“PPY”). Id. at 204431. Total suspended
24

25 ^{2/} Since publication of the EA, selective catalytic reduction technology has been applied to the two
26 EAX turbines that provide power to Mexico. This will result in lower NO_x emission levels from
27 those turbines, similar to emission levels from the two turbines providing power to the U.S.

1 solids (“TSS”) will be reduced by 1.590 million PPY, while biological oxygen demand (“BOD”)
2 will be reduced by 1.23 million PPY. Id. Chemical oxygen demand (“COD”) will also be
3 reduced by 4.23 million PPY, and iron will be reduced by 4,400 PPY. Id.

4 Similarly, the TDM facility will also eliminate biological contaminants and reduce other
5 chemical contaminants such as unwanted nitrogen, phosphorous, heavy metals, and agricultural
6 and industrial chemicals such as pesticides. Id. The TDM facility will include secondary and
7 tertiary treatment of recycled sewer water from the Zaragoza lagoons. Id. at 204430. Treatment
8 at the TDM facility will result in a net benefit to water quality in the New River, since BOD will be
9 reduced by approximately 1.5 million PPY; COD will be reduced by 1.76 million PPY, TSS will be
10 reduced by 850,000 PPY; TDS will be reduced by 2.6 million PPY, and iron will be reduced by
11 225 PPY. Id. at 204431.

12 The New River flows northward, crossing the international border near Calexico,
13 California, and discharges into the Salton Sea about 60 miles north of the location of the
14 generating facilities. Id. The Salton Sea is a terminal lake with no outlet to the ocean, and is a
15 repository for agricultural and municipal wastewater. Id. at 204391. Total yearly inflow to the
16 Salton Sea is approximately 1.36 million AFPY, which is approximately equal to its evaporation
17 rate. Id. The Salton Sea “is a sump not only for the water that flows into it but also for all the
18 salts, sediments, and other constituents dissolved in or transported by that water.” Id. at 204393.
19 A common indicator of the salt load is TDS, measured either as a concentration or as a total mass.
20 Id. The Salton Sea currently has a TDS of 44,000 milligrams per liter (mg/L), although salinity
21 continues to rise and is expected to exceed 50,000 mg/L by 2009. Id.

22 The New River flow at the border is approximately 182,000 acre-feet per year (“AFPY”).
23 Id. The concentration of TDS in the New River at the border is 2,600 mg/L, while the BOD is 20
24 mg/L, and the COD is 30 mg/L. Id. Both the Salton Sea and the New River are listed as impaired
25 surface waters in accordance with Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). Id. at
26 204391-92.

1 **LEGAL BACKGROUND**

2 **I. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT**

3 NEPA was enacted to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
4 environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
5 biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich the understanding of the
6 ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation.” 42 U.S.C. § 4321. The
7 purpose of NEPA is to focus the attention of the government and the public on the likely
8 environmental consequences of a proposed action before the action is implemented. Marsh v.
9 Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989). NEPA provides that federal
10 agencies should prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for “major Federal
11 actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” 42 U.S.C.
12 § 4332(2)(C).

13 NEPA’s mandate to agencies is “essentially procedural . . . It is to insure a fully informed
14 and well-considered decision” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
15 Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). “It is now well settled that NEPA itself does not
16 mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.” Robertson v. Methow
17 Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); see also Salmon River Concerned Citizens v.
18 Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1994).

19 In order to determine whether an action is one requiring an EIS, the agency may prepare
20 an Environmental Assessment (“EA”). 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). An EA is a concise public
21 document that should briefly describe the proposal, examine alternatives, consider environmental
22 impacts, and provide a listing of individuals and agencies consulted. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9.^{8/} If a

23 _____
24 ^{8/} See also River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of U.S. Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th
25 Cir. 1985) (“The purpose of an [EA] is to determine whether there is enough likelihood of
26 significant environmental consequences to justify the time and expense of preparing an
27 environmental impact statement.”); Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. Department of
Agriculture, 817 F.2d 609, 621 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that preparation of an EA “allows the
agency to consider environmental concerns, while reserving agency resources to prepare full EIS's

1 finding of no significant impact is made after the matter is adequately analyzed in an EA, then
2 NEPA does not require preparation of an EIS. Salmon River, 32 F.3d at 1356. “NEPA’s EIS
3 requirement is governed by the rule of reason . . . an EIS must be prepared only when significant
4 environmental impacts will occur as a result of the proposed action.” Cabinet Mountains
5 Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Salmon River, 32 F.3d at
6 1356. Although plaintiff need not show that significant effects will in fact occur, it must raise
7 “substantial questions whether a project may have a significant effect” on the environment. Blue
8 Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998).

9 **II. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT**

10 Because NEPA does not provide a cause of action, a federal agency’s decision to prepare
11 an EA rather than an EIS is reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C.
12 § 701 *et seq.* See Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222 F.3d 1105,
13 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). Under the APA, an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS may be
14 overturned only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
15 accordance with law.” Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir.
16 2002) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). Specifically, a court “must determine whether the agencies
17 that prepared the EA took a hard look at the environmental consequences of the proposed action.”
18 See Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).

19 The standard of review of an agency NEPA analysis under the APA is highly deferential,
20 and the agency’s decision “will only be overturned if the agency committed a clear error in
21 judgment.” Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1114-15 (internal quotations omitted); see
22 also Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Federal Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569, 573 (9th Cir.
23 1998) (considerable deference must be accorded to the agency with regard to the manner in which
24 it examines the environmental consequences of a project). The APA does not require—or even

25
26 _____
for appropriate cases”).

1 allow—a court to overturn an agency action because it disagrees with the agency’s decision or even
2 with its conclusions about the scope, breadth or effect of the environmental impacts of the project
3 at issue. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 553. Once a reviewing court is “satisfied that a proposing
4 agency has taken a hard look at a decision’s environmental consequences, [its] review is at an
5 end.” Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, as the
6 Supreme Court has admonished, the Court’s task is simply “to ensure a fully-informed and well
7 considered decision, not necessarily a decision that [the court] would have reached had [it] been a
8 member of the decisionmaking unit of the agency.” Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558.

9 “The National Environmental Policy Act does not require that we settle disputes between
10 scientists, it dictates that we defer to agency opinion if it is not otherwise shown to be arbitrary
11 and capricious.” City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1151-52
12 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Laguna Greenbelt Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 526 (9th
13 Cir. 1999) (“NEPA does not require us to decide whether an EIS is based on the best scientific
14 methodology available or to resolve disagreements among various experts.”).^{2/} “When specialists
15 express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinion of its
16 own qualified experts, even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more
17 persuasive.” Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378. “Because analysis of the relevant documents ‘requires a
18 high level of expertise,’ we must defer to the ‘informed discretion of the responsible federal
19 agencies.’” Id. at 378 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)).

20 Judicial review of federal agency actions under the APA is restricted to the administrative
21 record lodged by the agency, with limited exceptions. The APA expressly directs that “the court
22 shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. The APA
23 makes no provision for extra-record review. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 *et seq.* The Supreme Court has

24
25 ^{2/} See also Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985)
26 (“NEPA does not require that we decide whether an [environmental review] is based on the best
27 scientific methodology available, nor does NEPA require us to resolve disagreements among
various scientists as to methodology.”).

1 held that “in cases where Congress has simply provided for review [under the APA], . . . [judicial]
2 consideration is to be confined to the administrative record and . . . no *de novo* proceedings may
3 be held.” United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963) (citations omitted).^{10/}
4 See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (holding that the “focal point for judicial review
5 [of an agency decision] should be the administrative record already in existence, *not some new*
6 *record made initially in the reviewing court*”) (emphasis added). “The task of the reviewing court
7 is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review to the agency decision based on the record the
8 agency presents to the court.” Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44
9 (1985).

10 III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

11 The Ninth Circuit has endorsed the use of Rule 56 motions for summary judgment in
12 reviews of agency administrative decisions, under the limitations imposed by the APA. See, e.g.,
13 Northwest Motorcycle Assn. v. U.S. Dept. of Ag., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994)
14 (discussing the standards of review under both the APA and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). Pursuant to Rule
15 56, “[t]he moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law where, viewing the
16 evidence and the inferences arising therefrom in favor of the nonmovant, there are no genuine
17 issues of material fact in dispute.” Id. at 1472. “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify
18 which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
19 the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty
20 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Because the role of the Court under the APA is not to
21 “find facts” but is limited to reviewing the Administrative Record to determine whether DOE
22 considered the relevant factors and reached a conclusion that is not arbitrary and capricious, there
23 can be no genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment is the appropriate resolution of

24
25 ^{10/} See Lodge Tower Condominium Ass’n v. Lodge Properties, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Colo.
26 1995) (district court does not sit as a finder of fact because agency action is “reviewed, not tried,”
rather, “the issue is not whether the material facts are disputed, but whether the agency properly
dealt with the facts”).

1 this case.

2 **ARGUMENT**

3 **I. IN COMPLIANCE WITH ANY OBLIGATIONS UNDER NEPA, DOE AND BLM**
4 **TOOK A REASONABLE “HARD LOOK” AT THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF**
5 **THE PROPOSED ACTIONS**

6 **A. The EA Adequately Addressed Potential Impacts to Air Quality in the Salton**
7 **Sea Air Basin**

8 **1. The Effect On NO_x, CO, and PM₁₀ Will Not Be Significant**

9 Although the federal government does not have jurisdiction to regulate air pollutant
10 emissions originating in Mexico, DOE used regulations promulgated by the Environmental
11 Protection Agency (“EPA”) governing non-attainment areas to assess the potential effects of air
12 emissions from the LRPC and TDM facilities. DOE-101 at 204400. In the context of Clean Air
13 Act permitting in the United States, EPA establishes significance levels (“SLs”) below which
14 major sources are deemed not to contribute to violations of the National Ambient Air Quality
15 Standards (“NAAQS”) in areas where those standards are already not being met. 40 C.F.R.
16 § 51.165(b)(2); DOE-101, 204400. Where air dispersion modeling is performed, EPA does not
17 require a full impact analysis so long as emissions will not increase the ambient concentrations
18 above the SLs. DOE-101, 204402. Thus, the SLs provide a useful benchmark for NO_x, CO, and
19 PM₁₀, below which DOE reasonably concluded emissions were not “significant.” Id.

20 In this case, the combined emissions that will result from the generation of power to be
21 exported along the transmission lines fall well below the SLs that EPA has set for NO_x, CO, and
22 PM₁₀. DOE-101, 204404, 204406. Plaintiff contends that DOE “only addressed air impacts in
23 terms of EPA’s significance levels,” and that somehow this makes the analysis flawed. Assessing
24 the significance based on EPA standards that are set based on protecting human health and
25 welfare, is a reasonable and objective method for DOE to have considered air impacts, and this
26 Court’s task is not to second-guess agency choices of methodology. See, e.g., Laguna Greenbelt,
27 42 F.3d at 526 (“NEPA does not require us to decide whether an EIS is based on the best

1 scientific methodology available or to resolve disagreements among various experts.”). Moreover,
2 the EA does not rely on SLs alone, but also on the voluntary emissions reductions measures that
3 will be employed at the LRPC and TDM facility.

4 For example, both of the generating turbines at the TDM facility will utilize pollution
5 control technology in the form of “dry, low-NO_x combustor technology to minimize NO_x and CO
6 emissions from the combustion of natural gas, the exclusive fuel for the facility.” DOE-101,
7 204402. The turbines will also employ selective catalytic reduction and oxidizing catalyst systems
8 to further reduce NO_x and CO emissions, respectively. Id. The EBC and EAX export turbines at
9 the LRPC will also employ dry, low-NO_x combustor technology and selective catalytic reduction
10 technology. Id. at 204403, 204404. None of these measures are required by Mexican law, and
11 they are thus steps that will make this one of the cleanest burning plants in Mexico. See, e.g., id.
12 at 204404. In fact, levels of NO_x and CO emissions from the TDM facility “are the same as those
13 being routinely permitted in the United States and specifically, in California.” Id. at 204402.

14 Plaintiff makes much of the notion that if the generating facilities were built within the
15 United States, they would have to employ the best available control technology and emissions
16 offsets. Because the generating facilities are to be constructed in Mexico, however, the federal
17 government does not have regulatory authority over them. Nonetheless, the TDM facility is
18 employing such technology and the EBD and EAX turbines designated to export electricity to the
19 United States are also equipped with emission control technologies that will reduce emissions of
20 criteria pollutants below the significance levels established by the EPA. DOE-101, 204447.
21 Because this project will not significantly contribute to the existing NO_x, CO, and PM₁₀ levels in
22 Imperial County, California, DOE was not arbitrary and capricious in concluding that the project
23 will not significantly affect air quality in the United States.

24 2. Emissions Were Accurately Estimated

25 While Plaintiff argues that DOE underestimated emissions from the TDM facility, Pl.
26 Mem. at 23, the EA fully discloses the potential emissions from that facility based on information

1 provided by the permit applicants. See DOE-101, 204446 (“estimated emissions from the
2 generating facilities used in the analysis were taken from the information prepared to comply with
3 Mexico’s permitting requirements.”). According to SER’s application for its Presidential Permit,
4 the transmission lines would carry a “nominal 500 MW of power (approximately 700 MW
5 maximum peak) into the U.S., with the potential for an ultimate nominal 1000 MW (with an
6 approximate 1400 MW peak) of power using a possible future, second circuit” on the same
7 transmission line “to accommodate possible future expansion capability.” DOE-36, 202201;
8 DOE-35, 202188. At this time, however, SER has not indicated it has any plans to expand the
9 TDM facility. Additionally, the Mexican government has only given TDM permission to construct
10 a 500 MW facility. DOE-36, 202201. Thus, it is not reasonably foreseeable that merely because
11 the transmission line is capable of delivering “an ultimate nominal 1000 MW” of power, that such
12 an amount would in fact be transmitted.

13 The emissions data analyzed in the EA was taken directly “from the information prepared
14 to comply with Mexico’s permitting requirements,” and was reviewed by the agencies and found
15 to be accurate. DOE-101, 204446. The agencies determined that such “estimates were based on
16 the operating characteristics of the facilities, including the pollution control equipment the
17 applicants have agreed to install,” and thus were more accurate than “the undocumented higher
18 levels of emissions asserted by the commenters.” Id. The agencies adequately explained their
19 rejection of higher emissions levels asserted by commenters by noting that to the extent higher
20 levels asserted by commenters “may include emissions from facilities other than those associated
21 with the SER and BCP transmission lines, DOE and BLM do not agree that they are within the
22 scope of this EA.” Id.; see Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1120-21 (“[W]hen the record
23 reveals that an agency based a finding of no significant impact upon relevant and substantial data,
24 the fact that the record also contains evidence supporting a different scientific opinion does not
25 render the agency’s decision arbitrary and capricious.”).

26 Plaintiff’s argument that the TDM facility would result in “roughly double the emissions
27

1 disclosed in the EA” is based on speculation that SER may “construct[] additional turbines with
2 the same emissions control technology it says it is using on the first two turbines.” Pl. Mem. at
3 23. The agencies adequately explained in the EA why they did not use higher emissions figures:
4 Plaintiff has not pointed to anything in the record beyond SER’s comments about “possible future
5 expansion” of the TDM facility to demonstrate any actual plans for expanding that plant. See
6 DOE-36, 202201. Moreover, the agencies are entitled to rely on SER’s representation in its
7 application that the TDM facility is “proposed to be a nominal 500 MW electric generating
8 facility,” and are not required to speculate about potential expansion absent hard evidence in the
9 application that SER had obtained or was seeking to obtain permits from the Mexican government
10 authorizing expansion. See, e.g., City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1986)
11 (holding that a NEPA analysis “need not consider ‘remote and speculative’ alternatives whose
12 effects cannot be readily ascertained”) (citing Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551).^{11/} Because
13 expansion of the TDM facility is not reasonably foreseeable, DOE was entitled to rely on the
14 analysis submitted by SER for the 500 MW facility, and is not required to analyze additional,
15 speculative emissions.

16 3. Other Air Quality Effects Were Adequately Considered

17 Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that DOE was obligated to consider the potential effects of
18 carbon dioxide and ammonia, neither of which EPA has designated as “criteria pollutants.” See
19 Pl. Mem. at 23. Plaintiff, however, provides no legal authority for its proposition that DOE is
20 required to consider the impacts of either ammonia or carbon dioxide emissions from power
21 plants. See Pl. Mem. at 23-24.

22 Although Plaintiff cites to a consultant’s report which stated that DOE should assess “non-
23

24 ^{11/} See also Sierra Club v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 362, 368 (10th Cir. 1991) (“NEPA does not require an
25 agency to consider the environmental effects that speculative or hypothetical projects might have
26 on a proposed project.”); United States v. Southern Florida Water Management Dist., 28 F.3d
1563, 1573 (11th Cir. 1994) (“NEPA does not require evaluation of hypothetical proposals,
impacts and alternatives concerning a nonexistent federal proposal.”).

1 criterion [sic] air pollutants relevant to the proposed action,” nowhere does that report specifically
2 advise DOE that it should consider the impacts of carbon dioxide or ammonia emissions. See
3 generally DOE-055. Moreover, EPA itself did not advise DOE to consider the impacts of either
4 ammonia or carbon dioxide See generally DOE-086. Because of this, and because ammonia is
5 neither a federal hazardous air pollutant nor a California-identified toxic air contaminant, DOE-
6 023, 200819, it was not arbitrary and capricious for DOE not to address potential ammonia or
7 carbon dioxide emissions from the generating facilities. Johnston v. Davis, 698 F.2d 1088, 1092
8 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that a NEPA analysis “need not discuss every nuance of a proposed
9 action, nor need it give various questionable effects the weight demanded by various proponents
10 or opponents”); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1004 (10th Cir. 1973) (stating
11 that a NEPA analysis “did not have to dwell on the imaginary horrors posed by the plaintiffs”).
12 “An EA cannot be both concise and brief and provide detailed answers for every question.” Sierra
13 Club v. U.S. Forest Service, 46 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir. 1995).

14 **B. The EA Adequately Addressed Potential Effects on Water Quality and the**
15 **Salton Sea**

16 The slight reduction in inflow and increase in salinity of the Salton Sea are consistent with
17 Salton Sea restoration efforts and will not result in a significant effect upon that water body.
18 Although Plaintiff asserts that DOE has not provided a “convincing statement of reasons” why an
19 immeasurable change in salinity and inflow will be insignificant, DOE’s conclusion is in fact
20 soundly supported. Because the estimated decrease to inflow and change in salinity are within the
21 natural range of variability of the water body and are accompanied by reductions in biological and
22 chemical contaminants, the project “will have no measurable impact” on water quality. DOE-101,
23 204432. This impact, therefore, cannot be deemed significant.

24 The Salton Sea “is a sump not only for the water that flows into it but also for all the salts,
25 sediments, and other constituents dissolved in or transported by that water.” Id. at 204393. Thus,
26 any decrease in the salts, sediments, and other contaminants to the waters flowing into the Salton

1 Sea potentially benefits the Salton Sea itself. See id. at 204432 (“Ultimately, the reduction of
2 certain contaminants from Mexico that currently go into the Salton Sea will be a positive impact
3 on its ecosystem.”). The LRPC and TDM facilities combined will remove 6.12 million pounds of
4 TDS per year. Id. Moreover, each facility will also reduce other undesirable biological and
5 chemical contaminants in the New River. See id. at 204431.

6 For example, water returned to the New River will be “disinfected (i.e., treated to contain
7 very low levels of biological pathogens—bacteria or viruses).” Id. Undesirable “nutrients (nitrogen
8 species and phosphorus) and heavy metals will be reduced, and agricultural/industrial chemicals
9 (VOCs and pesticides) will be substantially removed by the treatment process.” Id. Because the
10 treatment will result in improved water quality for the New River, it will also result in “a positive
11 impact on [the Salton Sea] ecosystem.” Id. at 204432. Moreover, the water quality
12 improvements will also contribute to meeting international treaty standards between Mexico and
13 the United States. See id. (“The improvement in water quality from a biological standpoint will
14 greatly help achieve the bi-national water quality treaty standards as contained in [International
15 Boundary Waters Commission] Minute 264 for the New River.”).

16 Plaintiff’s disagreement with DOE’s conclusion that the Salton Sea would not be
17 significantly affected stems from the fact that while the water treatment will result in a net
18 decrease in the total *amount* of TDS in the Salton Sea, the slight decrease in water returned to the
19 New River might result in an increased *concentration* of TDS. Plaintiff asserts that this increase in
20 TDS concentration and any corresponding reduction to inflow are “at odds with the proposed
21 efforts to restore the Salton Sea.” Pl. Mem. at 13. Contrary to this assertion, the estimated
22 reduction in flow that will result from operation of the power plants falls within the range of flow
23 variations that the Salton Sea restoration project considered to be “reasonable future scenarios.”
24 See DOE-25, 200946 (considering modeled future inflows ranging from 0.8 million AFPY to 1.36
25 million AFPY). The reduction in water inflow modeled by the restoration project for future
26 scenarios varies up to 41 percent, whereas the chosen alternative here will only reduce inflow by

1 0.78 percent. See DOE-101, 204432. In addition, proposed restoration efforts involve
2 constructing evaporation ponds, which will evaporate 100,000 to 150,000 AFPY from the Sea.
3 See id. at 200947, 200949. Because the LRPC and TDM facilities are only estimated to reduce
4 the flow by 10,570 AFPY, much less than that of the restoration efforts, the transmission line
5 project is consistent with those restoration efforts and would not significantly affect their success.

6 Moreover, the estimated reduction from the project falls within the historic variability of
7 inflow, which generally varies between 1.19 and 1.55 million AFPY. See id. at 201228. Thus, it
8 was reasonable for DOE to conclude that the reduction to inflow would not be significant.

9 Plaintiff argues that DOE did not “consider that the Salton Sea is already suffering from
10 too much salt and that expensive efforts are underway to *remove already existing* salt
11 concentrations.” Pl. Mem. at 13 (emphasis in original). The EA, however, contains extensive
12 discussions concerning the potential effects on the salinity of the Salton Sea, and thus plainly
13 addresses this issue. See DOE-101, 204391 to 204394, 204431-32, 204446-47. The LRPC and
14 TDM facility are consistent with these efforts, however, because they too “remove already existing
15 salt” from the New River, a source for the Salton Sea. See id. at 204432 (“The LRPC and TDM
16 facilities combined will remove 6,120,000 pounds of TDS per year.”). According to the Draft EIS
17 for the Salton Sea Restoration Project, the “Salton Sea ecosystem is under stress from increasing
18 salinity, nutrient loading, oxygen depletion, and temperature fluctuations.” DOE-25, 200943.
19 Treatment of water at the LRPC and TDM facility will address the first three of these goals by
20 removing 6.12 million pounds of TDS responsible for increased overall salinity, reducing excessive
21 nitrogen and phosphorous, and reducing biological and chemical oxygen demands by 2.73 and
22 5.99 million pounds per year, respectively. See DOE-101, 204431. Thus, the project will be
23 consistent with restoration efforts by removing TDS that will otherwise be deposited in the Salton
24 Sea. The fact that the water inflow will be slightly reduced is negligible, since although it may
25 result in a slight increase in TDS concentration, the overall effect is that salts are permanently
26 removed from the sump-like ecosystem.

1 Although Plaintiff asserts that DOE's analysis of water quality is confined to two
2 sentences, Pl. Mem. at 12-13, the EA in fact devotes four and a half pages to discussion and
3 illustration of water quality in Chapter 3, DOE-101, 204390 to 204394; four additional pages to
4 analyses of water quality impacts in Chapter 4, id. at 204429 to 204432; and addresses the issue
5 again in the response to comments section. Id. at 204446-47. Plaintiff argues that although DOE
6 determined that the impact will be undetectable by measuring instruments, it may still be
7 significant. Pl. Mem. at 13. DOE's explanation for its conclusion that there would be no adverse
8 effects on the Salton Sea went beyond that single statement, as DOE explained, any increase in
9 salinity at the Salton Sea from operation of the power plants would be "essentially undetectable,
10 since the salinity with the Salton Sea can vary beyond this amount." DOE-101, 204431. Since the
11 normal variation of the salinity of the Salton Sea is greater than any impact from operation of the
12 power plants, it was logical and reasonable for DOE to conclude that salinity effects on the Salton
13 Sea were not significant.

14 **C. The EA Addresses A Reasonable Range Of Alternatives For The Proposed**
15 **Actions**

16 Plaintiff contends that DOE violated NEPA by allegedly failing to consider and analyze in
17 the EA "alternatives" to the proposed action that would have conditioned the Presidential Permits
18 on implementation of measures at the power plants in Mexico to further minimize the effects that
19 operation of these facilities may have on air and water quality. See Pl. Mem. at 18-22. Plaintiff's
20 contention is wrong for the simple reason that the SER's and BCP's "purpose and need" for the
21 proposed actions was to obtain Presidential Permits for the construction and operation of electric
22 transmission lines across the United States border with Mexico, not to obtain a permit for power
23 plants in a foreign country over which DOE has no jurisdiction. It is well-settled that NEPA does
24 not require a federal agency to consider alternatives to a proposed action that extend beyond the
25 purpose and need for the proposal, particularly when the action is proposed in an application for a
26 permit by a private entity such as SER or BCP.

1 As part of the NEPA process, an agency is to examine alternatives to the project at issue.
2 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E). An EA should include “brief discussions of the need for the proposal, of
3 [reasonable] alternatives as required by sec. 102(2)(E) [of NEPA],” and “of the environmental
4 impacts of the proposed action and alternatives.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b). The alternatives
5 examined in a NEPA analysis are guided by the stated purpose and need: “An agency must look
6 at every reasonable alternative, with the range dictated by the nature and scope of the proposed
7 action.” Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520,
8 1538 (9th Cir. 1997). “The range of alternatives that must be considered need not extend beyond
9 those reasonably related to the purposes of the project.” Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d
10 1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 1974). The range of alternatives considered in a NEPA review “must be
11 bounded by some notion of feasibility” and the statement of alternatives “cannot be found wanting
12 simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by
13 the mind of man.” Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551-52.

14 Absent a federal approval, NEPA does not cover private enterprises, such as a private
15 company’s construction of a power plant. See e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Heintz, 800 F.2d 822,
16 832 (9th Cir. 1986). NEPA does, however, dictate that an agency should analyze more than the
17 potential environmental impacts of the actual federal action, and should analyze the major
18 activities that will ensue as a result of the federal action, even if those activities are carried out
19 wholly by private parties. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 177 F.3d 800, 811
20 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, DOE and BLM analyzed the effects flowing from the issuance of
21 the Presidential Permits and ROWs, but also focused much of the NEPA review on the related
22 potential environmental impacts from operation of the associated power plants in Mexico.
23 Consequently, the agencies reviewed the environmental impacts of the power plants outside their
24 jurisdiction^{12/} based on the private entities’ description of how those plants would be constructed

25
26 ^{12/} As DOE correctly stated in the EA, “Neither the U.S. nor agencies of the State of California,
27 have jurisdiction over the regulation, permitting, or control of air pollutant emissions in

1 and operate, but properly considered alternatives based on the proposed *federal* actions--issuance
2 of the Presidential Permits and ROWs. This is the correct approach under NEPA.

3 When an agency's NEPA process is undertaken in response to an application for some
4 type of federal approval for a private project, the agency defines the purpose and need of the
5 project in the context of the project being pursued by the applicant: "When an agency is asked to
6 sanction a specific plan, . . . the agency should take into account the needs and goals of the parties
7 involved in the application." Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 196 (D.C.
8 Cir. 1991) (finding that the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") did not have to study
9 expanding regional air cargo capacity at airports other than the one where the project applicant
10 sought FAA approvals, since the project proponent had no intention of locating such services at
11 another airport). While the agency must also factor into the purpose and need statement "the
12 agency's statutory authorization to act, as well as . . . other congressional directives," an agency
13 "cannot redefine the goals of the proposal that arouses the call for action. . . ." Id. at 199.^{13/}

14 As with other aspects of NEPA, "the 'rule of reason' guides both the choice of alternatives
15 as well as the extent to which the [NEPA analysis] must discuss each alternative." City of Carmel-
16 by-the-Sea, 123 F.3d at 1155; see also Presidio Golf Club v. National Park Service, 155 F.3d
17 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1998). A party claiming that the agency's analysis of alternatives in a NEPA
18 analysis is arbitrary and capricious may not simply speculate that the agency should have
19 considered other alternatives. The party has the burden of offering tangible evidence that the
20 agency had other *reasonable and feasible* alternatives at its disposal. City of Angoon, 803 F.2d at
21 1022; see also Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff fails
22 to satisfy this burden. Indeed, they point to no evidence in the record where they even presented

23 _____
24 Mexico--such as those from the LRPC and TDM facilities--regardless of any potential impact in
the U.S." DOE-101, 204328.

25 ^{13/} See also Louisiana Wildlife Federation v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1048 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[I]t
26 would be bizarre if the [federal agency] were to ignore the purpose for which the applicant seeks a
permit and to substitute a purpose it deems more suitable.").

1 their suggestions of alternatives to DOE or BLM, let alone references to “specific evidentiary facts
2 showing that the alternatives were reasonable and viable.” City of Angoon, 803 F.2d 1022.

3 Alternatives raised by Plaintiff in its brief, such as “granting the Presidential Permits on the
4 condition that the power plants use state-of-the-art catalytic NOx and CO air emission control
5 systems; that the remaining emissions be offset by reductions in emissions from an existing source;
6 and that the power plants use dry cooling or parallel dry-wet cooling” (Pl. Mem. at 19-20), fall far
7 short of the type of “reasonable and feasible” alternatives required to be analyzed pursuant to
8 NEPA and offend the basic NEPA principles discussed above. The purpose and need of BCP’s
9 and SER’s applications for Presidential Permits was to construct and operate power lines across
10 the international border to import electricity into the United States to help address California’s
11 power supply crisis. DOE-101, 204324. The parties constructing and operating the power plants
12 did not need permission to do so from DOE, as such authorizations come from the Mexican
13 government and DOE has no authority to regulate private electrical power plants, particularly
14 those under the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. The international sensitivities relating to
15 Presidential Permits underscore the importance of limiting the range of alternatives to the actual
16 purpose and need of the proposed action in this instance. See, e.g., Greenpeace USA v. Stone,
17 748 F. Supp. 749, 760 (D. Haw. 1990) (“An extraterritorial application of NEPA to the Army’s
18 action in [a foreign country] with the approval and cooperation of the [foreign country] would
19 result in a lack of respect for the [foreign country’s] sovereignty, authority and control over
20 actions taken within its borders.”); NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 467-8
21 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that NEPA did not apply to Navy operations at three bases in Japan
22 “because there are clear foreign policy and treaty concerns involving a security relationship
23 between the United States and a sovereign power”).

24 DOE--in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense as specified in Executive
25 Order 10485 *as amended*--certainly retains the discretion to decline to issue a Presidential Permit
26 if it concludes that the environmental costs outweigh the public interest in issuing the Permit, and
27

1 it considered this alternative in the EA by analyzing the “no action” alternative and by addressing
2 alternatives in which it would issue only a single Presidential Permit to only one of the two
3 applicants. See DOE-101, 204328-30. NEPA, however, cannot be read to require DOE to turn a
4 Presidential Permit into a vehicle for regulating a private power plant in a foreign country, and
5 Plaintiff offers no legal support for such an assertion. To intrude on the jurisdiction of a
6 neighboring sovereign by using a Presidential Permit to regulate private actions beyond the United
7 States’ borders plainly exceeds the scope of the proposed action here and would raise serious
8 policy implications concerning DOE’s discretion in issuing the Permits, and thus was not a
9 reasonable and feasible alternative that should have been considered pursuant to NEPA. See, e.g.,
10 Seattle Audubon Society v. Mosely, 80 F.3d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996) (“An agency is under no
11 obligation to consider every possible alternative to a proposed action, nor must it consider
12 alternatives that are unlikely to be implemented or those inconsistent with its basic policy
13 objectives.”); Headwaters, Inc. v. BLM, 914 F.2d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Nor must an
14 agency consider alternatives which are infeasible, ineffective, or inconsistent with the basic policy
15 objectives.”); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that an
16 “‘alternatives’ discussion is subject to a construction of reasonableness” and that NEPA “should
17 not be employed as a crutch for chronic faultfinding. Accordingly, there is no need to consider an
18 alternative whose effect cannot be reasonably ascertained and whose implementation is deemed
19 remote and speculative.”); City of New York v. DOT, 715 F.2d 732, 744 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
20 that “an agency need not consider ‘alternatives which could only be implemented after significant
21 changes in government policy or legislation’”). DOE analyzed the potential environmental effects
22 of the power plants on the United States as those plants were reasonably expected to be operated,
23 but NEPA did not require DOE to develop and analyze a hypothetical alternative under which
24 DOE would regulate those facilities through conditions in the Presidential Permit.^{14/}

25
26 ^{14/} In responding to the comments suggesting that DOE impose conditions on the power plants
through the Presidential Permits, DOE properly noted that the owners of the power plants had

1 The range of alternatives that DOE needed to analyze was also reduced by the minimal
2 environmental impacts of the proposed action. An EA need not examine as broad a range of
3 alternatives as an EIS since the necessary range of alternatives diminishes as the expected impacts
4 diminish. See Friends of the Ompompanoosuc v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1549, 1558 (2d Cir. 1992)
5 (holding that the “range of alternatives an agency must consider is narrower when, as here, the
6 agency has found that a project will not have a significant environmental impact”); Sierra Club v.
7 Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1994) (“While an EA must contain a discussion of
8 alternatives, the range of alternatives that the Forest Service must consider ‘decreases as the
9 environmental impact of the proposed action becomes less and less substantial.’”). “Because the
10 EA concluded that the proposed rail line would have minimal environmental effect, the range of
11 alternatives that the Commission needed to consider was narrow. * * * It would be something of
12 an anomaly to require that an agency search for more environmentally sound alternatives to a
13 project which it has determined . . . will have no significant environmental effects anyway.”

15 committed to implementing a number of mitigating technologies, instead of analyzing Presidential
16 Permits conditions as a NEPA alternative. DOE-101, 204447. Plaintiff’s criticism that DOE has
17 no way of enforcing these “voluntary” measures is inapt. First, the Supreme Court has rejected
18 Plaintiff’s assertions that mitigation plans must be in place during the NEPA process. “[I]t would
19 be inconsistent with NEPA’s reliance on procedural mechanisms--as opposed to substantive,
20 result-based standards--to demand the presence of a fully developed plan that will mitigate
21 environmental harm before an agency can act.” Robertson v. Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 353.

22 Second, it is basic NEPA law that an agency’s obligation to consider environmental
23 impacts continues beyond the original environmental analysis such that the agency, as long as it
24 retains discretion to modify its action, may be required to supplement that analysis if new
25 information or project modifications indicate that the original analysis may no longer be accurate.
26 See, e.g., Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 569 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)
27 (“NEPA imposes on federal agencies a continuing duty to supplement existing EAs and EISs in
response to ‘significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and
bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.’”) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1509(c)(1)(ii)).

Thus, if the power plants did change the mode of operations in certain ways affecting the
nature of the environmental impacts, such as by switching to diesel fuel, DOE may be required to
revisit its NEPA analysis for these Presidential Permits. See, e.g., Northern Plains Resource
Council v. Lujan, 874 F.2d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 1989) (“NEPA does not require Interior to make
site-specific analysis of the impacts of all possible development alternatives. Instead, the NEPA
merely requires that Interior estimate the impacts of a likely or probable development alternative;
it need not prepare an EIS for speculative development alternatives, so long as it reserves the right
to preclude or prevent actions with unacceptable environmental consequences.”).

1 Missouri Mining, Inc. v. ICC, 33 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s assertion that DOE
2 violated NEPA by failing to develop and analyze a complex alternative with numerous and
3 expensive conditions on the power plants and international policy complications to mitigate
4 impacts that the agency found were minimal is without merit, even were such conditions within the
5 scope of the proposed actions.

6 DOE and BLM considered a reasonable range of alternatives in the EA, including denying
7 the Permits and ROWs (the “no action” alternative), granting only one Permit and not the other,
8 and looking at alternative locations for placement of the power lines. DOE-101, 204328-30.
9 Plaintiff does not propose any alternatives to the placement of the power lines, but instead asserts
10 only that DOE should have analyzed alternatives using the Presidential Permits as a tool to
11 regulate power plants under the jurisdiction of the Mexican government. NEPA does not require
12 such a result. Because Plaintiff has not identified any alternatives that are reasonable or feasible or
13 that could be implemented, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the EA did not consider a
14 reasonable range of alternatives.

15 **II. DOE AND BLM REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT THE TRANSMISSION**
16 **LINE PROJECTS DO NOT REQUIRE AN EIS**

17 NEPA requires the preparation of an EIS only for “major Federal actions significantly
18 affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The term
19 “significantly” requires consideration of two broad factors: context and intensity. See 40 C.F.R.
20 § 1508.27. The term “intensity” “refers to the severity of the impact.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b).

21 In evaluating intensity, agencies should consider ten criteria, including:

- 22 (2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public health or safety.
23
- 24 (5) The degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly
25 uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks.
26
- 27 (7) Whether the action is related to other actions with individually insignificant but
cumulatively significant impacts
- (10) Whether the action threatens a violation of Federal, State, or local law or
requirements imposed for the protection of the environment.

1 Id. It is not merely the “presence” of one of these factors which triggers the requirement to
2 prepare an EIS, Pl. Mem. at 11, but a determination under at least one of the factors that DOE’s
3 action is environmentally significant. See Public Citizen v. Department of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002,
4 1023 (9th Cir. 2003) (EIS is required if an agency’s “action is environmentally ‘significant’
5 according to any of these criteria”) (emphasis omitted); see also National Parks & Conservation
6 Assn. v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 731 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that each factor “*may* be sufficient to
7 require preparation of an EIS *in appropriate circumstances*”) (emphasis added). In this case,
8 DOE reasonably concluded that the above factors will not result in environmentally significant
9 effects.

10 **A. Potential Effects Of The Proposed Action Is Not Highly Controversial**

11 Although Plaintiff disagrees with the government over the potential air and water quality
12 impacts of the generating facilities, it has not demonstrated that the effects of the project are likely
13 to be so controversial as to require an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4). Although “[t]he
14 existence of a public controversy over the effect of an agency action is one factor in determining
15 whether the agency should prepare [an EIS],” Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1332, 1333
16 (9th Cir. 1992), mere opposition to a particular use does not create public controversy. See
17 Anderson v. Evans, 314 F.3d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002). Public controversy is insufficient to
18 require an EIS unless “‘substantial questions are raised as to whether a project . . . may cause
19 significant degradation of some human environmental factor,’ or there is a ‘substantial dispute
20 [about] the size, nature, or effect of the major Federal action.’” National Parks, 241 F.3d at 736
21 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (alterations in original). A substantial dispute exists
22 when evidence, raised prior to the preparation of an EIS or FONSI . . . casts *serious doubt* upon
23 the reasonableness of an agency’s conclusions.” Id. (emphasis added). If Plaintiff satisfies this
24 twofold showing, the burden then shifts to the government to provide a “well-reasoned
25 explanation” demonstrating why those responses disputing the EA’s conclusions “do not suffice to
26 create a public controversy based on potential environmental consequences.” Id. (citation

1 omitted).

2 Plaintiff here has not met its initial burden of showing a substantial dispute that raised
3 substantial questions about the validity of the government’s conclusions. Plaintiff points to
4 comments DOE and BLM received regarding potential effects on air and water quality that will
5 allegedly result from the construction of the generating facilities. Although Plaintiff claims that
6 “more than 99 percent of the comments submitted to DOE were critical of the EA’s analysis,” it
7 includes in its total four hundred identical electronic mail transmissions received after the close of
8 the comment period. Pl. Mem. at 14 n.2; see also DOE-101, 20442. Aside from this, DOE
9 received comments from only twelve organizations and individuals. Id. at 20442. Most of these
10 comments were from state, federal, and local agencies, and only one commenter was a private
11 individual.^{15/} See id. Twelve individually-written letters coming mostly from state and local
12 agencies should not constitute an “outpouring of public protest.” Cf. National Parks, 241 F.3d at
13 736 (450 comments received before publication of the EA and FONSI, 85% of which opposed the
14 chosen alternative, was an “outpouring of public protest”).^{16/} In addition, other than identifying
15 them, Plaintiff fails to explain how any of the comment letter raise “substantial questions” about
16 the validity of DOE’s conclusions.

17 Moreover, any indication of a controversy over the potential environmental effects was
18 addressed by the agencies’ consideration of and responses to the comment letters before finalizing
19 the EA. In accordance with NEPA, DOE and BLM addressed the comments by making
20 corrections, explaining or clarifying its position, or by modifying the EA and expanding the

22 ^{15/} Two congressional representatives also commented in their official capacity. DOE-101,
23 204442.

24 ^{16/} The court in National Parks did not consider the argument made here, namely that Plaintiff
25 cannot rely on substantially identical comments to establish an outpouring of public protest.
26 Although DOE did note the existence of the comments in the EA, similar to Public Citizen, 316
27 F.3d at 1027, Plaintiff’s assertion that “more than 99 percent” of the commenters were critical of
the EA must be viewed in light of the fact that 400 of 412, or 97 percent of these commenters
provided their comments in the form of “substantially identical letters.” DOE-101, 204442.

1 analyses. See DOE-101, 204442. DOE and BLM compiled the comments by category, and
2 examined each of the issues in some detail. See id. at 204442-48.

3 With respect to potential air impacts and the potential health effects relating to those
4 impacts, which were the focus of most of the comment letters, DOE explained the basis for its
5 conclusions and the reasons for determining, based on air quality modeling, that emissions from
6 the generating facilities will fall below the significance levels established by EPA for NO_x, SO₂,
7 CO, and PM₁₀. DOE-101, 204445-46. DOE and BLM noted that the EPA significance levels,
8 which are designed to protect the public health, see id. at 204361, “may generally be regarded as
9 thresholds of impact below which impact is not viewed to be significant.” id. at 204446. The EA
10 indicated that some commenters suggested that emission levels might be higher than those
11 predicted in the EA, but the agencies pointed out that those assertions were either
12 “undocumented” or erroneously included emissions from sources other than those related to the
13 export of electricity into the United States pursuant to the proposed Presidential Permits and
14 ROWs that constituted the proposed action subject to review under NEPA. Id. at 204446 .

15 As for potential impacts to the Salton Sea and other water-related issues, DOE responded
16 to comments by modifying the EA to include analysis of these potential impacts. Id. at 204446.
17 “DOE and BLM have modified this EA to include discussions of existing water use/quality and
18 potential impacts on water use/quality from the proposed actions.” Id. The agencies thus
19 addressed the comments by directly amending the EA. DOE determined that combined water use
20 by the generating facilities will reduce water flow into the Salton Sea by only 0.78 % of the total
21 inflow for that water body. Id. at 204432. Because such a small percent change in flow is below
22 the level of sensitivity of most detection instruments, DOE determined the effect will not be
23 significant. Id. at 204446-47. Likewise, DOE determined that the anticipated increase in salinity
24 of the Salton Sea of 0.142 percent was negligible, since it, too, was virtually undetectable. Id. at
25 204447.

26 Plaintiff does not dispute the percent change in salinity or inflow calculated by DOE. See

1 Pl. Mem. at 13. Instead, it is simply unwilling to accept the agencies' reasoning that immeasurable
2 impacts on salinity and inflow are insignificant. Plaintiff relies on a post-decisional letter from the
3 California Regional Water Quality Control Board to the International Boundary & Water
4 Commission expressing concern with Mexico's obligation to maintain water quality in the New
5 River. See Pl. Mem. at 13 (citing Fox Decl., Ex. B., p. 1). This letter is dated more than three
6 months after DOE issued its FONSI and Presidential Permits, and more than two months after
7 BLM issued its FONSI and granted the ROWs. See Fox. Decl., Ex. B. to Pl. Mem. Because the
8 letter was not before DOE or BLM at the time they made their decisions, it is outside the
9 Administrative Record and should not be considered by this court. See Citizens to Preserve
10 Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (review to be "based on the full
11 administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision."). Not only
12 is the letter outside the record, but it fails to mention the transmission line projects, DOE, or BLM
13 at all. See generally Fox. Decl., Exh. B. to Pl. Mem. Plaintiff cannot rely on this letter to establish
14 a controversy under NEPA, because "[t]he evidence establishing such a controversy must be
15 brought to the agency's attention while the agency is conducting its deliberations, not *post hoc*."
16 Public Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1027.

17 Nor can Plaintiff create controversy, as it attempts to do, by supplementing the record with
18 its own experts' conclusions based on the facts considered by DOE. This does not create
19 controversy, because "[i]f this type of disagreement were all that was necessary to mandate an
20 EIS, the environmental assessment process would be meaningless." Greenpeace Action, 14 F.3d
21 at 1335. Because Plaintiff merely attempts to recharacterize the potential effects on air and water
22 quality that DOE has adequately disclosed and analyzed, its disagreement with DOE as to those
23 effects cannot be the sort of public controversy that would require an EIS. See id. (agency's
24 analysis of impacts "would be for naught if by simply filing suit and supplying an affidavit by a
25 hired expert, predicated upon the same facts relied upon by the agency but reaching a different
26 conclusion, a litigant could create a controversy necessitating an EIS"). Thus, Plaintiff has not

1 shown that public controversy requires an EIS.

2 **B. The Potential Effects On Ozone Were Considered And Thoroughly**
3 **Addressed**

4 DOE's conclusion that potential effect of the project on ozone will not be significant is
5 well-reasoned, detailed, and supported by the Record. See, e.g., DOE-101, 204407-09. Although
6 Plaintiff contends that the effect on ozone is uncertain, Plaintiff merely disagrees with the method
7 chosen by DOE to estimate the project's effect on ozone concentrations. Such disagreement
8 about methodology, however, is not the type of uncertainty that warrants preparation of an EIS.
9 See e.g., Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985)
10 ("NEPA does not require that we decide whether an [environmental review] is based on the best
11 scientific methodology available, nor does NEPA require us to resolve disagreements among
12 various scientists as to methodology."). An EIS must be prepared "where uncertainty may be
13 resolved by *further collection of data*, or where the collection of such data may prevent
14 'speculation on potential . . . effects.'" National Parks, 241 F.3d at 732 (internal citation omitted)
15 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). This is not a case where "further collection of data"
16 would make the potential effect on ozone any more certain, however. Instead, the alleged
17 "uncertainty" about which Plaintiff complains stems from its disagreement with DOE's reasoned
18 choice to use NO_x, a precursor to ozone formation, to estimate effects on ozone.

19 As explained in the EA, ozone is not directly emitted but is formed in the presence of
20 sunlight and various other compounds, including NO_x, volatile organic compounds ("VOCs"), and
21 carbon monoxide, CO. DOE-101, 204407. Ozone forms when NO₂ is broken down by sunlight
22 to NO and O, followed by the oxygen atom, O, reacting with an oxygen molecule, O₂, to form O₃,
23 or ozone. Id. Because compounds such as VOC and NO_x (which includes NO₂ and NO) lead to
24 the formation of ozone in the presence of sunlight, they are called ozone precursors. See id.
25 Where the ratio of concentrations of VOC to NO_x is high, as it is in rural areas such as Imperial
26 County, ozone formation tends to be NO_x limited. Id. This means that adding more NO_x will

1 generally increase ozone production in such areas, including the border region in Imperial County.
2 Id.; see also DOE-55, 202850 (NO_x emissions are the dominant ozone precursor group for the
3 project).

4 DOE used NO_x emissions modeling to determine whether the export turbines associated
5 with the project will result in increased ozone formation in Imperial County. See id. at 204407,
6 204408. The results revealed that the four export turbines will increase NO_x concentrations at the
7 border by 0.33 μg/m³ on an annual basis, well within the EPA significance limitation of 1.0 μg/m³,
8 which DOE used as a benchmark of impact. Id. at 204407, 204408. Similarly, the hourly estimate
9 for NO_x from the four export turbines is 7.04 μg/m³, only 1.5 % of the California standard^{17/} of
10 470 μg/m³. Id. at 204407, 204408. Based on these comparatively small NO_x contributions
11 associated with the transmission lines, DOE determined that any corresponding increases in ozone
12 formation will also be very small. See id. at 204408; see also DOE-103, 204603 (“The calculated
13 levels in the U.S. of NO_x . . . were so small that it can be concluded the associated impact on
14 ozone levels in the U.S. would be minimal.”). DOE thus employed very specific NO_x modeling
15 results to determine there will be no potentially significant effect on ozone formation.

16 This is not a case where “further collection of data” would make the effect of ozone more
17 certain. Plaintiff is simply critical of DOE’s analytic method, not its lack of data. In fact the EA
18 demonstrates a well-reasoned basis for estimating effects on ozone by modeling NO_x, since NO_x is
19 a precursor to ozone that would influence its downwind formation at the border. See DOE-101,
20 204407. Although Plaintiff cites a government consultant’s report to contend that ozone
21 modeling should have been conducted, Pl. Mem. at 16, DOE determined in the EA that such
22 models were not feasible because of limitations on their accuracy in estimating ozone contributions
23 from a single source. See DOE-101, 204408. Plaintiff nevertheless would dictate DOE’s analytic
24 methods, even though EPA itself has not approved a modeling procedure for determining the
25

26 ^{17/} EPA has not adopted an hourly significance limitation for NO_x. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(b)(1).
27

1 impact of individual emission sources on downwind ozone levels. See DOE-101, 204408.

2 The consultant’s report cited by Plaintiff states that in the absence of an EPA-approved
3 model, one option would be to employ a photochemical grid model such as UAM or CAMx.
4 DOE-58, 203338. However, the report also states that this “may still be viewed as too much of a
5 resource burden to implement for an EA.” Id. In fact, DOE concluded as much and further
6 explained the limitations of these unapproved ozone models:

7 Regulators have used resource-intensive ozone modeling procedures to evaluate
8 the combined impacts of numerous sources on regional ozone levels (e.g., the
9 UAM-V and CAM-X reactive grid models). These grid models have limited
10 resolution to estimate incremental impacts resulting from the relatively low levels
11 of emissions of ozone precursors from an individual source, and there is no U.S.
12 EPA-approved methodology for adjusting the parameters of these models to try to
13 estimate small impacts from low-emitting sources. These modeling tools have
14 therefore not been recommended for use in evaluating impacts from ozone sources.

15 DOE-101, 204408.

16 Although Plaintiff would have this Court believe that DOE’s decision to use NO_x to model
17 ozone makes the effect on ozone uncertain, that argument is a mere disguise for an attack on the
18 adequacy of DOE’s methodology. As stated previously, a court is not permitted to prescribe one
19 particular methodology over another, but only to assess whether the agency’s decision was based
20 on a reasoned analysis. See Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1359
21 (9th Cir. 1994) (court is not required to decide whether EA “is based on the best scientific
22 methodology available, nor does NEPA require [the court] to resolve disagreements among
23 various scientists as to methodology”); see also Hells Canyon Alliance v. U.S. Forest Serv., 227
24 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2000) (agency’s methodology need only satisfy the “rule of reason”).
25 The EA explains DOE’s method of analyzing ozone and the basis for the conclusion that potential
26 ozone effects were not significant.

27 **C. The Project Does Not Threaten To Violate Local, State, Or Federal Laws
Meant To Protect Air Quality**

Contrary to what Plaintiff alleges, the issuance of the Presidential Permits and ROWs do
not threaten to violate local, state, or federal laws meant to protect air quality. As a preliminary

1 matter, Plaintiff does not assert that the construction or operation of the transmission lines
2 themselves will threaten to violate such laws. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the LRPC and TDM
3 facilities, both located in Mexico, must comply with California and Imperial County laws as if the
4 facilities had actually been constructed in the United States. As DOE and BLM indicated, this
5 plainly is not the law, and NEPA does not require the agencies to analyze the project in such
6 terms. See, e.g., DOE-101, 204328 (stating that “[n]either the U.S. nor agencies of the State of
7 California have jurisdiction over the regulation, permitting, or control of air pollutant emissions in
8 Mexico--such as those from the LRPC and TDM facilities--regardless of any potential impacts in
9 the U.S.”). Because federal, state, local laws do not apply to these foreign facilities and because
10 the facilities are not being authorized by the proposed actions that are the subject of the EA, their
11 operation cannot threaten to violate such laws. The agencies therefore cannot be found to have
12 been arbitrary and capricious in determining that this was not a factor affecting significance under
13 NEPA.

14 Plaintiff notes that California has set emissions limits “that are, in some cases, more
15 stringent than federal standards.” Pl. Mem. at 17. Plaintiff, however, does not point to any
16 provision of state law that the project will violate, but only refers generally to the table of state air
17 quality standards in the state administrative code. See Pl. Mem. at 17 (citing the table of ambient
18 air quality standards found at Cal. Code Regs. title 17 § 70200). In fact, a comparison of
19 California ambient air quality standards with the estimated concentration increases in NO_x, CO,
20 and PM₁₀ disclosed in the EA fails to support Plaintiff's claim that the project will result in a
21 violation of state standards. Compare DOE-101, 204362 (listing state standards) with id. at
22 204406 (listing concentration increases at the border predicted to result from the export turbines);
23 see also id. at 204408 (noting that NO_x increases attributable to the export turbines will only
24 amount to 1.5 percent of the California state standard). Thus, even if California law applied to the
25 LRPC and TDM facilities, the project will not necessarily cause the state ambient air quality
26 standards to be violated.

1 Moreover, DOE found that the owners of both LRPC and the TDM facility have taken
2 substantial measures to reduce air emissions. The TDM facility will voluntarily employ Best
3 Available Control Technology (“BACT”), including: dry low-NO_x combustor technology, a
4 selective catalytic reduction system (“SCR”), and catalytic oxidizers to control CO emissions.
5 DOE-101, 204447. This will allow air emissions from the TDM facility to meet California
6 emissions standards. *Id.* at 204447. The EBC and EAX export turbines will also employ dry low-
7 NO_x combustors and SCR. *Id.* These voluntary mitigating measures further ensure that operation
8 of the power plants is consistent with United States’ standards, even though those standards do
9 not apply.

10 Nor will the project result in the violation of Imperial County Air District rules. Plaintiff
11 asserts that because the Mexican generating facilities are located in the Salton Sea Air Basin, they
12 must comply with the Air Pollution Control District (“APCD”) rules for new stationary sources
13 constructed in Imperial County. However, the reach of the Imperial County APCD Rules is
14 limited to new sources under the APCD’s jurisdiction. *See* Cal. Health & Safety Code § 40001(a)
15 (“[D]istricts shall adopt and enforce rules and regulations to achieve and maintain the state and
16 federal ambient air quality standards in all areas affected by emission sources *under their*
17 *jurisdiction*”) (emphasis added). Because the Mexican generating facilities do not fall within
18 the legal jurisdiction of the APCD or California at all, the transmission lines do not threaten to
19 violate state or local air quality laws. Thus, the federal agencies reasonably concluded that the
20 potential environmental effects of the projects were not “significant” under 40 C.F.R.
21 § 1508.27(b)(10), and an EIS is not required.

22 **D. The Project Will Not Result In Cumulatively Significant Impacts**

23 Plaintiff also contends that DOE failed to consider various cumulative effects related to
24 other generating facilities that “will be constructed in the border region.” Pl. Mem. at 16. DOE,
25 however, considered the possibility that other power plants would be sited in the border region
26 and found such “rumors . . . to be unsubstantiated.” DOE-101, 204438 (noting that “DOE and
27

1 BLM are not aware of any electric generating facilities in the project area other than the LRPC
2 and TDM facilities actually being planned.”). Moreover, the cumulative impacts section of the EA
3 analyzed not only the potential NO_x emissions that will result from turbines associated with export
4 along the project transmission lines, but those associated with the entire LRPC, including turbines
5 devoted exclusively to providing power to Mexico. See id. at 204438.

6 According to the air dispersion modeling analysis conducted for the entire LRPC facility,
7 the projected increases in ambient concentrations of NO_x, CO, and PM₁₀ that will result at the
8 United States border “can be seen to remain below SLs established by the EPA.” Id. at 204438,
9 204439. Thus, DOE reasonably concluded based on the ambient air quality modeling that any
10 cumulative effect on air emissions will not be significant. The agencies conducted an extensive
11 analysis of potential cumulative environmental impacts, and reasonably concluded that cumulative
12 impacts were not a significant factor necessitating preparation of an EIS. Id. at 204436-40.

13 **E. Health Impacts Were Adequately Considered**

14 The EA adequately accounted for potential health effects because it determined that the
15 emissions from the generating facilities would fall within the EPA-designated SLs, which
16 themselves protect public health. See id. at 204402 (emissions from TDM facility would fall
17 within SLs); id. at 204404 (same as to emissions from LRPC export turbines); id. at 204445
18 (response to comments that emissions would “cause serious health impacts”). Emissions below
19 SLs are not considered to cause or contribute to violations of the NAAQS. See 40 C.F.R.
20 § 51.165(b)(2). The NAAQS themselves are designed to protect public health. See 42 U.S.C. §
21 7409(b)(1) (NAAQS “shall be ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of
22 which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate
23 margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.”). Thus, so long as the emissions
24 related to the transmission lines do not contribute to violations of the NAAQS, DOE’s and BLM’s
25 actions will not have significant effects on public health. See DOE-102, 204472 (“If measured or
26 predicted concentrations of the criteria pollutants are below the ambient standard, no health effects

1 are expected.”).^{18/}

2 DOE articulated this reasoning in the EA in response to comments that emissions would
3 “cause serious health impacts.” See id. at 204445-46. Also, as Plaintiff acknowledges, Pl. Mem.
4 at 12 n.1, a discussion of potential health effects is contained in the EA Appendix. Because the
5 Appendix is part of the EA, there is no basis for Plaintiff to discount that discussion. See Found.
6 for North American Wild Sheep v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172, 1176 n.12,
7 1178 (9th Cir. 1982) (court’s review and opinion was based on “information . . . gleaned from the
8 EA and its appendices”).

9 As discussed in the EA Appendix, SER’s application evaluated potential acute, chronic,
10 and cancer health effects resulting from the TDM facility and found them to be “substantially
11 below their relative thresholds of 10 in 1 million, 0.5 and 0.5, respectively.” DOE-102, 204486.
12 The methodology for this evaluation is fully set forth in the EA appendix. Id. at 204485-86.
13 Potential health effects associated with hazardous air pollutants were also examined by estimating
14 their ambient concentrations, then comparing the results to EPA “Reference Exposure Levels
15 (RELs) and Unit Risk Factors (URFs).” Id. at 204485. It was determined from this analysis that
16 the TDM facility “will not have a substantial impact on ambient pollutant on the region surrounding
17 the project site.” Id. at 204486. Modeling data for the LRPC export turbines also employed a
18 “detailed analysis to ensure . . . that no negative health impacts are generated.” Id. at 204468.

19 In sum, DOE employed detailed emissions modeling to determine that any emissions from
20 the generating facilities would fall below the SLs, which themselves account for the effect of
21 emissions on public health. See DOE-101, 204445-46 (responding to various commenters’
22

23 ^{18/} The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of health effects in Public Citizen, 316 F.3d 1002, does not require
24 preparation of an EIS in this case. The court in Public Citizen did not consider the circumstances
25 here, where an agency adequately considers potential health effects when it makes a reliable
26 determination that the proposed action would meet EPA SLs. For purposes of this case, there is
27 no “marginal degradation” in air quality as discussed in Public Citizen because the emissions do
not exceed the threshold of the SLs. Because emissions would not exceed the SLs, the health
effects are not significant, and the agencies reasonably concluded that an EIS was not necessary.

1 assertions that emissions would “cause serious health impacts”). Moreover, the EA Appendix
2 demonstrates chronic, acute, and cancer health effects were also considered. DOE took a hard
3 look at health effects, and NEPA requires no more.

4 **CONCLUSION**

5 The detailed EA and FONSI and voluminous Administrative Record demonstrate that
6 DOE and BLM took the requisite “hard look” at the environmental impacts of issuing the
7 Presidential Permits and ROWs. Plaintiff has failed to show that the agencies’ analyses or
8 conclusions were “arbitrary and capricious.” Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
9 should be denied, and this Court should grant summary judgment in favor of Federal Defendants.

10
11 Respectfully submitted this _____th day of March, 2003

12
13 CAROL C. LAM
14 United States Attorney
15 TOM STAHL
16 Assistant U.S. Attorney
17 U.S. Attorney’s Office
18 Federal Office Building
19 880 Front Street, Room 6293
20 San Diego, California 92101-8893
21 Telephone: (619) 557-7140

18 THOMAS L. SANSONETTI
19 Assistant Attorney General

21 _____
22 ANDREW A. SMITH
23 United States Department of Justice
24 Environment & Natural Resources Division
25 New Mexico Bar No. 8341
26 c/o United States Attorney’s Office
27 P.O. Box 607
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103
Telephone: (505) 224-1468

BRIAN C. TOTH
United States Department of Justice

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Environment & Natural Resources Division
P.O. Box 663
Washington, D.C. 20044-0663
Telephone: (202) 305-0639

Attorneys for Federal Defendants

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

2 I certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing FEDERAL
3 DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
4 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
5 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Federal Express overnight courier (Saturday delivery) on the
6 7th day of March, 2003, addressed to the following:

7 JULIA A. OLSON
8 Wild Earth Advocates
9 1646 E. 19th Avenue, Suite A
10 Eugene, Oregon 97403

11 and by regular mail first class postage prepaid on the 7th day of March, 2003, addressed to the
12 following:

13 MARTIN WAGNER
14 Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund
15 426 17th Street
16 Oakland, California 94612

17 AMY G. NEFOUSE
18 Latham & Watkins
19 701 B Street, Suite 2100
20 San Diego, California 92101

21 JANICE M. SCHNEIDER
22 Latham & Watkins
23 555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
24 Washington, DC 20004

25 CAREY L. COOPER
26 Klinedinst, Flieman & McKillop, P.C.
27 501 West Broadway, Suite 600
San Diego, California 92101

ERIC J. MURDOCK
Hunton & Williams
1900 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006-1109

Andrew A. Smith
Counsel for Federal Defendants