Bulletin of Developments in Environmental and Administrative Law

Federal Court RemovalPFAS Town of Pine Hill v. 3M Co., 2026 WL 2178967 (11th Cir. July 29, 2026). The Eleventh Circuit (Newsom, Kidd, Wilson) ordered the removal under the federal-officer removal statute of a town’s state-law tort suit against manufacturers of products containing PFAS. It was irrelevant that the manufacturer was not a federal contractor at the time. Although the town disclaimed any relief from contamination stemming from products that the manufacturer produced for the U.S. military, that did not negate any connection between the state-law claims and the manufacturer’s actions as a federal contractor (which contributed to the overall contamination). In assessing relatedness under this prong of the federal-officer-removal statute, the court must credit the defendant’s theory of the case. And the manufacturer had a colorable federal-contractor defense to liability.

CERCLA Harris Investment Holdings, LLC v. BFJ of USA, Inc., 2026 WL 2196425 (4th Cir. July 30, 2026). The Fourth Circuit (Agee, Traxler, Floyd) reversed a grant of summary judgment for the defendant in a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act action. The defendant claimed the protection of CERCLA’s “petroleum exclusion,” which applies even if a petroleum product is partially composed of a hazardous substance that is individually listed in the relevant statutes. However, if a petroleum product is contaminated with an additional hazardous substance, then the petroleum exclusion does not apply. Here, the district court improperly concluded that there was no question of material fact as to whether any releases contained contaminated petroleum products.

PreemptionStanding Vapor Tech. Ass’n v. Wooten, 2026 WL 2192803 (4th Cir. July 30, 2026). The Fourth Circuit (Agee, Thacker) affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction in a challenge to a North Carolina law curtailing the sale of vape products. The challengers argued that the North Carolina law is preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. The Food and Drug Administration has taken the position that those laws require the FDA’s pre-sale approval of vape products, but the FDA has been deliberately lax in enforcement. The challengers—manufacturers whose vape products have not been approved—have Article III standing to challenge the North Carolina law, even though they are selling products in violation of federal law. There is no requirement that a plaintiff have a legal right to engage in particular conduct, just a requirement that they suffer concrete harm. On the merits, the relevant preemption, preservation, and savings clauses of the two federal laws do not preempt the North Carolina law. Nor is there obstacle preemption. Judge Quattlebaum dissented on standing, arguing that lost revenue from illegal activity cannot be an injury in fact.

Indian LawPipelines Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Inds. of the Bad River Rsrv. v. Enbridge Energy Co., 2026 WL 2198120 (7th Cir. July 30, 2026). The Seventh Circuit (Easterbrook, Scudder, St. Eve) affirmed summary judgment to the Bad River Band on its trespass and unjust enrichment claims against Enbridge Energy over the company’s continued operation of the Line 5 pipeline across parcels of allotted Indian land, and on Enbridge’s breach-of-contract counterclaim. The Band did not consent to Enbridge’s operation of the pipeline following the expiration of its easements. And the Band was not obligated to consent under an agreement with the company, especially in light of the caution required before reading a contract to restrict a tribe’s sovereign control over its territory. Enbridge was not entitled to the continuing effect of its prior license under an Administrative Procedure Act provision concerning license renewals. While the Band was entitled to restitution for these claims, the district court’s calculations abused its discretion, requiring remand. Injunctive relief in some form was also appropriate, but the district court exceeded its discretion in imposing a three-year deadline for Enbridge to remove the pipeline from the allotted parcels in light of the United States’ Transit Treaty with Canada and possible harmful effects on energy consumers. On remand, the district court was to fashion an appropriate remedy that afforded Enbridge a realistic opportunity to reroute the pipeline while ensuring that task occurred swiftly. The Band’s federal common law public nuisance claim, however, was displaced by the Pipeline Safety Act, requiring vacatur of the district court’s injunction on the claim. The PSA tasks the Pipeline Health and Safety Administration with monitoring and responding to the safety risks at the core of the Band’s claim. That was true notwithstanding the Act’s savings clause.

Preemption Iowans for Alts. to Smoking & Tobacco, Inc. v. Mosiman, 2026 WL 2197766 (8th Cir. July 30, 2026). The Eighth Circuit (Loken, Gruender, Grasz) vacated a district court’s preliminary injunction against an Iowa statute prohibiting electronic nicotine delivery systems that have not received Food and Drug Administration authorization. The plaintiff pro-vaping coalition had standing to sue based on its retailer members, who met the threshold for a pre-enforcement injury-in-fact. But it was not likely to prevail on the merits of its preemption claim. The presumption against preemption applied. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act did not expressly preempt the Iowa statute because, among other reasons, its preservation clause expressly allows more stringent state laws, and its preemption clause did not apply to rules concerning premarket review. There was no conflict preemption. There was also no obstacle preemption, because a state law that replicates a federal law generally does not create implied preemption and the plaintiff conflated federal enforcement priorities with federal law. Judge Loken concurred in the vacatur of the preliminary injunction but reasoned that a more developed record was required to understand how Iowa’s statute would affect the FDA’s exclusive federal authority.

FPAStanding Advanced Energy United v. Federal Energy Regul. Comm’n, 2026 WL 2211250 (D.C. Cir. July 31, 2026). The D.C. Circuit (Millett, Walker, Childs), in a per curiam decision, denied petitions for review challenging the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s order directing transmission providers to overhaul how they process grid interconnection requests (Order 2023). The Clean Energy Petitioners, who challenged Order 2023’s rule setting the threshold at which an interconnection customer can withdraw without a fee, had standing because the record established that at least one member participates in the interconnection queue as a customer and was developing projects that would be subject to the fines. The respondent-intervenor Clean Energy Advocates had standing to defend the order and, in particular, the fees the order imposed on transmission providers and system operators for missing study deadlines, because vacating the study-delay incentive scheme would result in renewed interconnection delays and expose their members to higher electricity costs. The panel left for another day whether respondent-intervenors were required to establish standing when they intervene on behalf of the government. On the merits, each of three aspects of the order survived review: (1) the thresholds for fine-free withdrawal were not arbitrary and capricious; (2) the incentive system for timely completion of interconnection was within the FERC’s statutory authority, was not arbitrary and capricious, and did not yet pose any takings or due process problem; and (3) the FERC’s choice of model for the affected-system studies was not arbitrary and capricious.

Standing Bay Area Unitarian Universalist Church v. Ogg, 2026 WL 2209133 (5th Cir. July 31, 2026). The en banc Fifth Circuit (Jones) affirmed a decision finding that property owners lacked standing to sue a district attorney, sheriff, and police chiefs to invalidate a state statute criminalizing carrying guns onto premises where a property owner prohibits firearm possession. The property-owner plaintiffs challenged the law because, in their view, it required them to post signage with specific statutory requirements. The plaintiffs lacked standing to press their claim because the statute did not require posting signage to receive protection (they could instead provide an oral warning or summon law enforcement to do so), and it was speculative to assume that the statute would cause law enforcement to violate plaintiffs’ right to exclude. Redressability also was lacking because the court could not rewrite the statute or compel law enforcement to arrest and prosecute permitted conduct. The majority rested on traceability and redressability, but expressed doubts about whether there was injury in the first place. Judge Willett (joined by Judge Elrod) concurred to explain that the majority erred when it suggested that redressability was absent simply because the requested relief should not issue. Instead, the relevant question was whether the requested relief, if granted, would remedy the asserted injury. Judge Higginson dissented because he viewed the statute as burdening plaintiffs right to exclude. Judge Douglas (joined by Judges Graves and Higginson) also dissented, explaining that the record showed that the law burdened plaintiffs because, absent a specialized sign, gun owners were comparatively undeterred and that striking the heightened signage requirements could reduce plaintiffs’ harms.

Final Agency Action Scottsdale Capital Advisors v. U.S. SEC, 2026 WL 2207244 (10th Cir. July 31, 2026). The Tenth Circuit (Hartz, Kelly, Tymkovich) affirmed the dismissal of a broker-dealer’s Administrative Procedure Act challenge to a Securities and Exchange Commission rule incorporating Treasury Department regulations. As relevant here, there was no final agency action because the broker-dealer challenged the SEC’s filing of a judicial enforcement action based on the rule, which the broker-dealer believed created a new legal regime. But an agency’s filing of an enforcement action does not meet the legal-consequences prong of Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), because it creates no legal obligations other than the procedural obligation to respond and litigate the suit.

CAACitizen Suits GreenLatinos v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., 2026 WL 2220583 (10th Cir. August 3, 2026). The Tenth Circuit (Bacharach, Kelly, Federico) reversed the dismissal of a citizen suit against refineries under the Clean Air Act. The district court had relied on the Act’s “diligent prosecution bar” to dismiss the suit, finding that the plaintiffs’ claims were sufficiently related to ongoing consent decrees that the Environmental Protection Agency and the refineries entered into decades ago, as well as administrative actions stemming from the consent decrees. However, the diligent prosecution bar (which is nonjurisdictional) only applies to an ongoing judicial enforcement action. Ongoing consent decrees may count; administrative actions do not. In addition, the citizen-suit claims must be enforcing the same standards or limitations as the prior enforcement action—not the “substantially similar” ones on which the district court partially relied. The Tenth Circuit remanded for the district court to determine whether the claims in this suit concerned the same standards or limitations as those addressed by the underlying consent decrees.

Commerce Clause United States v. Doe, 2026 WL 2221977 (10th Cir. August 3, 2026). The Tenth Circuit (Phillips, Kelly, Moritz) rejected a criminal defendant’s Commerce Clause challenge to a federal statute prohibiting juvenile possession of a handgun. Congress had a rational basis to conclude that prohibiting juvenile handgun possession is an essential part of a regulatory scheme addressing interstate sales of handguns to juveniles, because the possession prohibition targets demand. Congress also had a rational basis to conclude that the regulation of such handgun sales would be undercut if juveniles could lawfully possess them.

CERCLAFederal Court RemovalPCBs City of Brunswick v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 2026 WL 2224648 (11th Cir. August 3, 2026). The Eleventh Circuit (Branch, Luck, Lagoa) ordered the removal of a city’s state-law suit against a manufacturer and a power company for torts related to their pollution of a site. Removal under the federal-officer removal statute was proper because the defendants’ liability arose out of their obligations under a consent decree with the Environmental Protection Agency. In carrying out the consent decree, the defendants were not merely acting as regulated entities but rather in the EPA’s stead—as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act would have otherwise obligated the EPA to remediate the site itself. The city’s tort claims are “closely connected” to the defendants’ consent-decree activities, as Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, 146 S. Ct. 1052 (2026), requires. And the defendants have a colorable claim that CERCLA preempts state-law liability.

Original Jurisdiction Demir v. Mullin, 2026 WL 2240700 (7th Cir. August 4, 2026). The Seventh Circuit (Brennan, Scudder, Jackson-Akiwumi), in a per curiam decision, reversed a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of a plaintiff’s challenge to his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist and Selectee List. A federal statute channeling challenges to orders issued by the Transportation Security Administration to courts of appeals did not apply to the plaintiff’s challenge, because the TSA does not control either list. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, however, the dismissal of the plaintiff’s challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program as procedurally deficient. Under analogous in-circuit precedent, and a consensus of out-of-circuit precedent, that program is an “order” within the meaning of the jurisdictional statute, notwithstanding the Administrative Procedure Act’s distinction between orders and rules and regulations. So, it had to be filed in the court of appeals in the first instance. Judge Scudder, joined by both colleagues, concurred to urge a “course correction” by the circuits or the Supreme Court to square interpretations of the direct review provision with plain meaning, canons of construction, and the APA.

CASARemedies HM Florida-ORL, LLC v. Governor of Florida, 2026 WL 2235960 (11th Cir. August 4, 2026). The en banc Eleventh Circuit (Brasher) vacated a preliminary injunction against a Florida law making it a crime to “knowingly admit a child to an adult live performance.” As relevant, six judges would hold that the district court’s injunction—which enjoined the law’s enforcement statewide—was an impermissible universal injunction under Trump v. CASA, Inc., 602 U.S. 831 (2025). It did not matter that the plaintiff had brought a facial First Amendment overbreadth claim. The overbreadth doctrine exists to enable the plaintiff to obtain relief, not to enable relief for others. A majority of the court determined that the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was likely to fail on the merits. Judge Grant concurred in part. She would not reach the scope-of-relief issue given the merits ruling. Judge Rosenbaum dissented on the merits and on the scope-of-relief issue. Judge Abudu dissented on the merits, discussing the usefulness of legislative history.

Ripeness TitleMax of S.C., Inc. v. Spicher, 2026 WL 2251903 (4th Cir. August 5, 2026). The Fourth Circuit (Thacker, Rushing, Benjamin) affirmed the dismissal of a South Carolina lender’s constitutional challenge to a Pennsylvania agency’s administrative enforcement actions against it. The lender’s claims relating to ongoing state administrative-enforcement proceedings were barred by Younger abstention, because the administrative proceedings were akin to criminal proceedings in important respects. The lender would have an adequate opportunity to present its constitutional claims in those proceedings. And the lender’s challenge to the Pennsylvania agency’s issuance of an investigative subpoena was not ripe because the subpoena was not self-enforcing. The lender’s injuries would arise only upon judicial enforcement of the subpoena.

CAALoper Bright Comm. for a Better Arvin v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 2026 WL 2251528 (9th Cir. August 5, 2026). The Ninth Circuit (S.R. Thomas, Mendoza) remanded without vacatur a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency’s approval of state implementation plan submissions for the San Joaquin Valley. The approval was premised in part on the EPA’s new view that the Clean Air Act’s contingency measure requirement is qualified by the measure’s “feasibility.” Interpreted independently following Loper Bright, the statute did not support that approach. If Congress had wanted to consider feasibility in the relevant provision, it would have said so (as it did elsewhere). Nor did the directive to design specific contingency measures implicitly grant the EPA discretion to consider feasibility. And the EPA’s interpretation undermined the contingency measures’ role in the statutory scheme and ran afoul of statutory purpose. Judge Bress dissented, reasoning that the majority elevated labels over substance, that the challenged “feasibility” analysis was shorthand for compliance with the statute and consistent with its requirements, and that the majority imposed unreasonable regulatory burdens.

CWA Inland Empire Waterkeeper v. Corona Clay Co., 2026 WL 2251545 (9th Cir. August 5, 2026). The Ninth Circuit (Nguyen, Forrest, VanDyke) reversed an order denying a motion for a new trial in a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act and remanded for further proceedings on whether a creek was “water of the United States” subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act. Though the issue was not previously raised or litigated, once it became legally viable, it was raised at the earliest opportunity, and the district court retained jurisdiction to preside over a new trial. Because the panel could not determine in the first instance whether the waterbody satisfied the standard outlined in Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023), it remanded for further proceedings.

Eminent DomainInjunctionsTakings PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC v. Arentz Family, LP, 2026 WL 2263342 (4th Cir. August 6, 2026). The Fourth Circuit (Wilkinson, Richardson, Berner) affirmed a preliminary injunction ordering landowners to allow temporary access to their property so that an energy company could complete studies to obtain a state-law permit to build an energy transmission line (the Maryland Piedmont Reliability Project). Maryland state law required such access for purposes of the State’s permitting requirements. With respect to the other factors, the company would be irreparably harmed by a lack of access that would otherwise completely prevent the project from going forward. On the balance of the equities, the mandated access did not amount to a temporary taking without compensation. The common law has long recognized, as a condition on property rights, the right of a public utility to enter upon land for the purpose of making surveys preliminary to an eminent-domain proceeding. Any diminution in property value from this access does not constitute a taking. On the public-interest factor, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a federally-approved project that addresses energy demands generally benefits the public.

StandingUltra Vires National Tr. for Hist. Pres. in the U.S. v. National Park Serv., 2026 WL 2276494 (D.C. Cir. August 7, 2026). The D.C. Circuit (Millett, Garcia) affirmed a preliminary injunction preventing above-ground construction of the planned White House East Wing ballroom, except to the extent such construction is necessary for safety –and security. The National Trust had associational standing because its members use the areas with views of the White House, and the new ballroom would lessen the aesthetic and recreational values of the area. The government’s argument that members of the public would not be able to see the ballroom was dismissed as “pure fiction.” Nor could the government defeat standing on the theory that plaintiffs could simply avert their eyes, that these harms could be dismissed as generalized grievances, or that standing is not present unless a plaintiff changes his or her conduct. As for the germaneness component of associational standing, the National Trust had demonstrated expertise in preservation of historic buildings and lands. The National Trust is distinct from some associations, in that it has statutorily enumerated authority. But the germaneness inquiry likely is not limited to the National Trust’s enumerated statutory authorities, and, in any event, the litigation served the purposes of those authorities too. On the merits, the Constitution gives Congress exclusive authority to regulate federal property, and neither of the statutory authorities the government cited authorized the ballroom construction. The government violated the Administrative Procedure Act by relying on 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a), because it does not authorize ballroom construction. And the government acted ultra vires by relying on the President’s authority under 3 U.S.C. § 105(d), because their theory relied on a patent misconstruction of that provision. The National Trust also would face irreparable harm from allowing continued construction, and equitable considerations also supported an injunction. Judge Rao dissented because she concluded that National Trust had failed to establish two components of associational standing—that any member would be harmed and germaneness—and because she concluded that the Trust was not likely to prevail on the statutory arguments.

APACASAChannelingFundingGrantsInjunctionsOrganizational StandingRemedies Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2026 WL 2279789 (1st Cir. August 7, 2026). The First Circuit (Barron, Lipez, Rikelman) largely affirmed a preliminary injunction ordering several agencies to resume processing grants awarded under the Inflation Reduction Act and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The nonprofits had standing to sue, notwithstanding the government’s argument that the National Conference of Nonprofits needed to show that its members directed or controlled the organization. There is no such requirement. The agencies’ actions—the freeze directive by the Office of Management and Budget and the actual freezes by each agency—were discrete and final, and the nonprofits’ Administrative Procedure Act challenge was therefore not an improper “programmatic attack.” The agencies were also unlikely to show that those actions are committed to the agencies’ discretion by law. The nonprofits had a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the funding freeze was arbitrary and capricious, because the agencies failed to consider reliance interests before cutting off the funds. As to remedy, the terms of the district court’s injunction improperly required the agencies to make monetary payments under contracts, which the APA does not permit. The portion of the order prohibiting the agencies from relying on the challenged actions to deny funds was permissible. CASA’s prohibition on overbroad relief did not apply, because the district court relied on its remedial APA authority under 5 U.S.C. § 705 and not its general equitable authority.

Organizational Standing Arizona All. for Retired Ams. v. Mayes, 2026 WL 2277101 (9th Cir. August 7, 2026). The en banc Ninth Circuit (Johnstone) vacated a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Arizona election-law amendments that required cancellation of voter registration when voters move and register to vote in a new county, and that criminalize knowingly providing a mechanism for voting to someone registered in another state. Organizational plaintiffs had standing to challenge the latter but not the former. Circuit precedent that did not ask whether challenged conduct directly affected and interfered with plaintiff organizations’ core activities was overruled as inconsistent with FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024). Because the organizations did not clearly show that the cancellation provision affected and interfered with their voter registration and education efforts, they did not establish a sufficiently concrete and particularized injury in fact to challenge it. The felony provision, however, was subject to the lower threshold for standing in pre-enforcement challenges. The organizations faced a credible threat of prosecution for voter registration and education effort. But they were not likely to prevail on the merits of the claim. Judge Bress, joined by four colleagues, concurred only in the judgment as to the cancellation provision, reasoning that the majority reached the right result on the cancellation provision but failed to engage with the core reasoning of Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. Judge VanDyke concurred similarly and would have adopted a lower threshold for three-judge panels to modify circuit precedent in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions.

Dormant Commerce ClauseStanding PacifiCorp v. Sixkiller, 2026 WL 2277099 (9th Cir. August 7, 2026). The Ninth Circuit (Rawlinson, Bumatay) affirmed the dismissal of a utility’s Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a Washington decarbonization and cap-and-trade program. To mitigate the burden of the program on electricity customers, the program allocated greenhouse gas emissions allowances to the utility for electricity sold in the state, but not electricity exported elsewhere. The expense of purchasing allowances for exported electricity conferred standing on the utility to challenge the program even if it might eventually pass those costs on to its customers. But because of regulatory differences between in-state electricity producers and exporters, the utility did not plausibly allege that the program’s regulations or allowances were applied to similarly-situated entities. Judge Bress dissented, reasoning that the program facially discriminates against interstate commerce by imposing greater costs on interstate electricity sales, and that because the case was at the pleading stage, the proper course was to remand for factual development as to whether the program’s compliance costs and allowances were roughly equivalent in a way that would justify otherwise discriminatory treatment.

CheneryHarmless Error Orellana-Ramos v. Blanche, 2026 WL 2293277 (4th Cir. August 10, 2026). The Fourth Circuit (Quattlebaum, Benjamin, Berner) granted a noncitizen’s petition for review and remanded for further proceedings on her asylum application. As relevant here, because the Board of Immigration Appeals had relied on one ground to deny the asylum claim, the court did not evaluate whether the claim might fail on other grounds. Judge Quattlebaum concurred, questioning whether the administrative rule of harmless error—as recently articulated by the Supreme Court in FDA v. Wages & White Lion Investments, L.L.C., 604 U.S. 542 (2025)—might properly require the court of appeals to evaluate those alternative grounds itself, rather than interpreting the Chenery principle to require a remand. Here, however, the government had not asked the court to decide the case on those alternative grounds.

Appellate JurisdictionStanding Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Mullin, 2026 WL 2317908 (D.C. Cir. August 11, 2026). In a per curiam decision, the D.C. Circuit (Srinivasan, Rao, Walker) vacated an Administrative Procedure Act Section 705 stay of two government actions intended to subject noncitizen parolees to expedited removal because the plaintiff membership organizations lacked standing. The Section 705 stay was immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because it had the practical effect of granting an injunction. The plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to show that vacating the two challenged government actions would likely reverse the trend of increased expedited removals, given that such relief would not impact a regulation allowingthe government to subject parolees to expedited removal. This redressability problem did not deprive the government of standing to appeal, because standing is based on the order sought but appellate standing is based on the order entered, and the latter could have been plausibly read to further restrict expedited removal of parolees beyond what plaintiffs sought.

ESA Friends of Animals v. Williams, 2026 WL 2318424 (D.C. Cir. August 11, 2026). The D.C. Circuit (Henderson, Pillard, Wilkins) reversed a decision that held that the Fish and Wildlife Service’s interpretation of 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e) of the Endangered Species Act was invalid. Section 1533(e) allows the Service to treat a species as endangered or threatened if it is similar in appearance to a species that is so listed. But the Service had interpreted that provision not to apply when a species is already listed as endangered or threatened. The provision’s text and contemporaneous regulations confirmed the Service’s interpretation was correct.

Congressional Review Act Ohio Telecom Ass’n v. Fed. Comm’cns Comm’n, 2026 WL 2209992 (6th Cir. July 31, 2026). The Sixth Circuit granted en banc rehearing of a panel decision (see Issue 25.17) denying petitions for review of a Federal Communications Commission rule imposing reporting requirements on telecommunications providers in the event of data breaches involving customers’ personally identifiable information, rejecting the petitioners’ statutory interpretation and Congressional Review Act challenges.

Grants Climate United v. Citibank, N.A., 2026 WL 2235002 (D.C. Cir. August 4, 2026). The en banc D.C. Circuit, in a per curiam decision, affirmed a preliminary injunction preventing the Environmental Protection Agency from effectuating its March 11, 2026 notice terminating grants and seeking to claw back funds already dispersed. Six judges (Millett, Pillard, Wilkins, Pan, Garcia) concluded that the EPA’s actions violated Section 60103 of the Inflation Reduction Act. Five of those judges would have affirmed the entire preliminary injunction, notwithstanding the repeal of Section 60103, while Judge Millett viewed the repeal as requiring vacatur or modification of injunction. Four Judges (Srinivasan, Katsas, Rao, Walker) would have vacated the preliminary injunction its entirety due to the repeal of Section 60103. The issues on which the court was equally divided were affirmed by operation of D.C. Circuit Rule 40(d).