Compiled by Ben Chagnon, Caroline Flynn, Chris Meyer, and Linnet Davis-Stermitz, with the assistance of Anna Iacobucci, to highlight recent court decisions and legal developments in environmental and administrative law
Issue 26.12
Supreme Court
Recent Notable Decisions
Seventh Amendment Federal Commc’ns Comm’n v. AT&T, 2026 WL 1593357 (June 4, 2026). The Court (Roberts) held that the Federal Communications Commission’s administration process for investigating suspected violations of communications laws complied with the Seventh Amendment. Although the administrative process permitted the Commission to determine liability and order a penalty, the scheme was consistent with the Seventh Amendment because the Commission cannot collect the penalty until it proves its case to a jury in a trial de novo. The fact that the order was a predicate to bringing suit and might cause reputational and practical harms did not give rise to any Seventh Amendment violation. Justice Thomas dissented because he viewed the Commission’s order as not being non-binding and enforceable only before a de novo trial.
Statutory Interpretation FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Cap. Master Fund, 2026 WL 1686059 (June 11, 2026). The Court (Barrett) held that the Investment Company Act does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of any contract that allegedly violates the Act. The Court emphasized its rejection of the use of legislative history to do more than clarify the meaning of words as used in the enacted statutory text. Justice Kagan dissented, noting that legislative history can be relevant to interpret “stubbornly ambiguous” statutory text. Justice Jackson dissented, criticizing the majority for refusing to use legislative history that she viewed as compelling evidence of Congress’s actual intent as to the availability of a private right of action.
Recent Notable Order
EPCA American Gas Ass’n v. Department of Energy, No. 25-879 (June 8, 2026). The Court granted this petition, vacated, and remanded a decision of the D.C. Circuit presenting the questions (1) whether courts may defer to an agency’s legal interpretation of a statute because an agency applied the statute to undisputed facts, despite the Court’s holding in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024); and (2) whether an appliance’s ability to operate in existing homes and buildings without renovation is a “performance characteristic” that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act prohibits the Department from eliminating. The Court remanded for further consideration in light of the Solicitor General’s position in his cert-stage brief.
Upcoming Cert Petitions
To be considered at the June 18, 2026 and June 25, 2026 conferences
Dormant Commerce ClausePreemption Triumph Foods, LLC v. Campbell, Atty. Gen. of Mass., No. 25-1047. This petition from a First Circuit decision presents the questions (1) whether a state law regulating pig farming and pork production imposes additional or different—even if non-conflicting—requirements on pork producers, and is thus preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act under principles of express or implied preemption; and (2) whether the state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause or the other constitutional doctrines.
Agency Authority RMS of Georgia, LLC, dba Choice Refrigerants v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 25-1079. This petition from a D.C. Circuit decision presents the question whether Congress violated the Vesting Clause of Article I by giving an executive agency unbounded discretion to choose which private parties are entitled to participate in a multibillion-dollar market.
NGATakings Hoffman v. WBI Energy Trans., Inc., 25-159. This petition from an Eighth Circuit decision (splitting with the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits) presents the question whether, in private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act, just compensation should be determined by reference to state law.
Preemption Wells Pharma of Houston, LLC v. Zyla Life Sciences, LLC, No. 25-257. This petition from a Fifth Circuit decision presents the question whether the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempts private state-law unfair competition and consumer protection claims premised on the marketing of compounded drugs without premarket approval.
Judicial Review Sullivan v. United States, 25-1082. This petition from a Ninth Circuit decision (splitting with the Second and Seventh Circuits) presents the question whether 18 U.S.C. § 1505, which criminalizes obstruction of “a proceeding . . . before a [U.S.] department or agency,” carries a nexus requirement—the requirement that a defendant’s conduct have the “natural and probable effect” of obstructing a proceeding and that the defendant know that his conduct will have that effect—upon which a jury must be instructed.
Original JurisdictionWater Rights Nebraska v. Colorado, No. 22O161. This bill of complaint alleges that Colorado has breached the South Platte River Compact by allowing unlawful water diversions and by blocking Nebraska’s efforts to construct a canal, allegedly depriving Nebraska of access to water it is entitled to under the Compact.
Takings Operating Eng’rs Trust Fund v. United States, 25-1050. This petition from a Federal Circuit decision presents the question whether the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that group health plans contribute billions of dollars to subsidize reinsurance for third parties was a taking of the plans’ private property.
Standing Arizona v. Promise Arizona, 25-1022. This petition from a Ninth Circuit decision concerning two Arizona laws relating to voting access presents the questions (1) whether Article III allows an organization to sue when an unknown number of its unidentified members “may be” injured, as the Ninth Circuit held below (in conflict with at least seven other circuits); and (2) whether the Ninth Circuit improperly reweighed evidence of discriminatory purpose while purporting to review the district court’s finding for clear error.
CWA California Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Nickels, 25-989. This petition from a Ninth Circuit decision presents the questions (1) whether the Clean Water Act exempts from its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permitting program “discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture” as the statute expressly provides (33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1)), or instead exempts “irrigation return flows that do not contain additional point source discharges from activities unrelated to crop production,” as the Ninth Circuit interpreted; (2) whether the Clean Water Act’s exemption from its NPDES permitting program of “discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture” (33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1)) exempts dispersed pollutants from non-farm sources that are collected and commingled with agricultural return flows before their discharge to waters of the United States; and (3) whether the principle that “a point source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the pollutant to ‘navigable waters’” (South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105 (2004)) applies to the Clean Water Act’s exemption of “discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture.”
First AmendmentTakings Pharmaceutical Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. O’Day, 25-1018. This petition, from a Ninth Circuit decision, presents the questions (1) whether a state government reporting requirement, which mandates pharmaceutical manufacturers create reports including narrative justifications for pricing, is subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny and satisfies such scrutiny, so long as the requirement aims to correct “information asymmetries” that are “product-specific”; and (2) whether entities that operate in “highly regulated” industries categorically lack reasonable investment backed expectations in their trade secrets for purposes of the Takings Clause.
Standing Anoka Hennepin Educ. Minn. (Am. Fed. of Teachers Local 7007) v. Huizenga, 25-888. This petition from an Eighth Circuit decision presents the questions (1) whether the Supreme Court should repudiate the municipal-taxpayer exception to the general rule against taxpayer standing; and (2) whether, if there is such an exception, a municipal taxpayer challenging a municipal policy must at least show that the policy imposes a measurable cost on the municipality and that the policy necessarily implicates funds attributable to municipal taxes.
Courts of Appeals
Recent Notable Decisions
Skidmore Department of Labor v. Comprehensive Healthcare Mgmt. Servs., 2026 WL 1582064 (3rd Cir. June 3, 2026). The Third Circuit (Chagares, Porter) reversed in part and affirmed in part a post-trial judgment awarding damages for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act in a suit brought by the Department of Labor on behalf of 6,000 employees at healthcare facilities. Claims for “overtime gap time” are not cognizable under the FLSA: The plain text of FLSA does not contemplate a remedy for such time, and the Department’s interpretive guidance indicating otherwise was not persuasive under Skidmore because the guidance, notwithstanding its longstanding nature, contained no support for its position and could not be squared with the text. Judge Roth dissented on this point, emphasizing that she would have deferred to the agency under Skidmore.
Citizen SuitsCWAPFASPreliminary InjunctionsStanding West Virginia Rivers Coal. v. Chamber of Comm. of the U.S.A., 2026 WL 1579491 (4th Cir. June 3, 2026). The Fourth Circuit (Niemeyer, Quattlebaum, Rushing) reversed a preliminary injunction preventing a polymer plant from releasing more hexafluoropropylene oxide dimer acid than its Clean Water Act permit allows. The citizens-suit plaintiff had associational standing because one of its members refrains from boating in the polluted part of the Ohio River. While “standing by avoidance” has its critics, it remains good law under Supreme Court precedent; the frequency of the member’s past use of the river doesn’t matter under that precedent either. But the plaintiff had not shown irreparable harm. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), forecloses consideration of harm to the public as opposed to the plaintiff. Contrary to the district court’s belief, there is no presumption of irreparable harm simply because there is a continuing violation of federal environmental law. And the member’s claim of a health harm based on a single exposure to this chemical was not sufficiently supported by expert testimony.
JusticiabilityStanding Jonathan R. v. Morrisey, 2026 WL 1660492 (4th Cir. June 4, 2026). The Fourth Circuit (Harris, Floyd) reversed the dismissal of West Virginia foster children’s class action alleging systematic constitutional violations in the State’s child-welfare system. The plaintiffs’ injuries were redressable through their requested injunctive and declaratory remedies; redressability does not require certainty of complete relief, only a likelihood that judicial intervention will improve the challenged conditions. Measures reducing caseloads for workers, enforcing strict time limits on initial evaluations, and requiring the State to hire more employees are all likely to result in quicker foster placement as well as greater attention and treatment for each child in the system. Federal courts have the authority to address systemic constitutional violations through broad institutional-reform remedies, including the direction of state funds, within guardrails set by the Supreme Court. The majority declined to reach West Virginia’s cross‑appeal on class certification because it was interlocutory and the State failed to meet the Rule 23(f) deadline. Judge Rushing dissented in part; she would have reached the class-certification issue.
APAPreemption California ex rel. Becerra v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 2026 WL 1614176 (9th Cir. June 4, 2026). The Ninth Circuit (Callahan, H.A. Thomas, Johnstone) denied a petition for review brought by California officials seeking review of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s determination that California’s meal and rest break rules, as applied to drivers of passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles, were preempted. Circuit precedent foreclosed the state entities’ argument that their rules were beyond the scope of the agency’s express preemption authority and the entities were incorrect that the agency had not promulgated preemptive regulations. Nor did the agency act arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that the state rules would impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Among other things, the administrative record amply supported that finding.
Preemption Grafton & Upton R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 2026 WL 1615709 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2026). The D.C. Circuit (Pillard, Walker, Ginsburg), in a per curiam decision, held that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act does not preempt a state law giving a Massachusetts town the right to purchase forest land that is being sold for conversion to a residential, industrial or commercial use. The Surface Transportation Board correctly denied a railroad purchaser’s petition to preempt the law, because the ICCATA preempts only state laws that “have the effect of managing or governing rail transportation,” and the state law at issue was a generally applicable property-acquisition law.
FPAStanding MISO Transmission Owners v. Fed. Regul. Energy Comm’n, 2026 WL 1615394 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2026). The D.C. Circuit (Pan, Garcia, Edwards) denied petitions for review by transmission owners and the Louisiana Public Service Commission challenging the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s decision to approve retroactive refunds after retroactively adjusting a rate. The transmission owners’ argument failed because FERC set the new retroactive rate to cure a defect previously identified by the court, and the Federal Power Act authorizes retroactive changes in rates in response to court rulings. The transmission owners lacked standing to pursue their alternative claim that FERC erred by permitting multiple complaints challenging the rate because an order barring FERC from considering successive complaints would not redress any past harm from having had to defend against successive complaints and it is speculative whether they would be forced to do so again. The Louisiana Public Service Commission’s petition likewise failed. The Public Service Commission had standing, notwithstanding its failure to advance a complete standing argument until its reply brief, because it was obvious that the Public Service Commission’s customers were subject to the rates. But on the merits, the Public Service Commission’s arguments were barred by law-of-the-case or reasonably rejected by FERC.
Seventh Amendment Sligo Creek Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2026 WL 1615174 (4th Cir. June 5, 2026). The Fourth Circuit (Rushing, Heytens, Floyd) denied a petition for review of a Department of Health and Human Services administrative-enforcement action against a nursing home participating in Medicare that failed to follow internal infection-control policies. The nursing home claimed that HHS’s civil-penalty enforcement proceedings violated its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The public-rights exception to the Seventh Amendment applies—allowing Congress to assign the claim’s adjudication to an agency—because HHS’s claim of a Medicare-condition violation, like the claim at issue in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), is unknown in the common law.
Judicial ReviewStatutory Interpretation Nobles v. Mullin, 2026 WL 1617622 (7th Cir. June 5, 2026). The Seventh Circuit (Ripple, Lee, Kolar) affirmed the dismissal of claims challenging the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ rejection of petitions to classify a noncitizen spouse as an immediate relative under federal immigration law. Because that rejection was premised on the government’s determination that the citizen spouse failed to show he posed no risk to his noncitizen spouse, and that determination is entrusted by statute to the agency’s sole and unreviewable discretion, it is unreviewable by law. The couple could not evade that problem by challenging the legal standard and processes the agency deployed in rejecting their petitions, because the statutory phrase “determine” denoted that Congress committed to agency discretion the process as well as the outcome. That conclusion accords with the reasoning of six circuits but splits with the D.C. Circuit, rejecting the latter court’s reliance on the Administrative Procedure Act’s presumption favoring judicial review. The one claim for which there was no jurisdiction-stripping failed on the merits.
Organizational StandingStanding International Rights Advocates v. Mullin, 2026 WL 1615584 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 2026). The Federal Circuit (Reyna, Taranto, Stoll) affirmed the dismissal of an advocacy organization’s suit seeking to compel Customs and Border Protection to investigate whether cocoa products imported from Côte d’Ivoire are produced using child labor in violation of the Tariff Act. The organization alleged that it suffered financial harm as a result of CBP’s lack of action on its petition, including by expending resources on its own ongoing investigations to provide the agency with the updated information it requested. But this merely amounts to an allegation that the organization’s mission has been compromised by the agency’s inaction—which FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024), forecloses—not that the organization’s customer-service activities have been impeded. And the organization’s costs to get the agency updated information were self-inflicted.
Standing Arcidiacono v. Whitehorn, 2026 WL 1649646 (7th Cir. June 8, 2026). The Seventh Circuit (Sykes, St. Eve. Maldonado) affirmed on different grounds the dismissal of a putative class action challenging an Illinois agency’s rejection for hypertechnical or baseless reasons of the plaintiffs’ admissions packets for long-term care facilities. Although the district court had dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, the plaintiffs in fact lacked standing. They sought only injunctive relief and showed no real and immediate threat of repeated future injury. The rejection of their admission packets did not harm them: While the rejection meant that the facilities were not reimbursed for a portion of their care, and they received the bills instead, those bills were meaningless, because beneficiaries are not liable for the cost of unreimbursed care.
SeverabilityStanding New Mexico Trappers Ass’n v. Torrez, 2026 WL 1642568 (10th Cir. June 8, 2026). The Tenth Circuit (Bacharach, Ebel, Kelly) affirmed the dismissal of trapper organizations’ constitutional challenge to a New Mexico law prohibiting trapping. The state law exempts trapping by members of federally recognized Tribes when conducted solely for religious or ceremonial purposes. The trappers (who are not tribal members) claimed that this exemption violated the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses. The trappers lack standing based on the denial of their opportunity to trap, because success on their constitutional claims would not redress that injury; if the exemption were held unlawful, it would be severed. And the trappers’ claimed psychological and stigmatic injuries were not ripe, because a New Mexico agency had yet to issue necessary rules implementing the exemption. Alternatively, those injuries are not cognizable because the trappers’ theory of stigmatic harm is too abstract and amounts to a generalized grievance.
PipelinesStays Sierra Club v. North Carolina Dep’t of Envt’l Quality, 2026 WL 1689722 (4th Cir. June 11, 2026). The Fourth Circuit (Gregory, Wynn, Thacker) denied environmental plaintiffs’ motion for a stay pending review of a water-quality certification issued by a North Carolina agency for the Southgate Pipeline Project. Although the final three stay factors tilted modestly in the challengers’ favor, they had not made the requisite strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the certification was arbitrary and capricious.
Private Nondelegation National Horsemen’s Benevolent & Prot. Ass’n v. Black, 2026 WL 1689717 (5th Cir. June 11, 2026). The Fifth Circuit (King, Duncan, Engelhardt), following remand for further consideration in light of FCC v. Consumers’ Research, 606 U.S. 656 (2025), reissued its earlier decision (107 F.4th 415 (July 5, 2024)) holding that the enforcement provisions of the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2020 violated the private nondelegation doctrine. HISA unconstitutionally delegated enforcement power by permitting a private entity, the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority, to enforce the Act without sufficient executive oversight. Consumers Research did not require a different result because it articulated the private nondelegation doctrine the same way and was distinguishable because the Authority, unlike the entity at issue in Consumers Research, did not function subordinately to the agency.
Due Process iCare Child Dev. Ctr. v. Cicero-Brown, 2026 WL 1693784 (11th Cir. June 11, 2026). The Eleventh Circuit (W. Pryor, Abudu, Conway) affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction in a childcare provider’s constitutional challenge to its dismissal from a Georgia voucher program. Under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test for procedural due process claims, the provider was not entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing. Assuming (without deciding) that the provider has a property interest in its continued participation in the program, that interest is less weighty than that of a welfare or disability-benefits recipient. The risk of erroneous deprivation is lessened where the provider’s dismissal was primarily based on its failure to comply with an on-site investigation. And the government has significant interests in child safety and in conserving resources.
Recent Notable Orders
PreemptionSpending Clause AbbVie, Inc. v. Brown, 24-1939 (4th Cir. June 2, 2026). AbbVie, Inc. v. Brown, No. 24-1939, and PhRMA v. McCuskey, No. 25-1054 (4th Cir. June 2, 2026). The Fourth Circuit granted en banc rehearing of panel decisions holding Maryland and West Virginia laws preempted. The state laws require drug manufacturers participating in the Medicaid 340B drug-rebate program to further discount their drugs to sell to contract pharmacies in the States. There is a circuit split over similar state laws.
PreemptionSpending Clause PhRMA v. McCuskey, No. 25-1054 (4th Cir. June 2, 2026). AbbVie, Inc. v. Brown, No. 24-1939, and PhRMA v. McCuskey, No. 25-1054 (4th Cir. June 2, 2026). The Fourth Circuit granted en banc rehearing of panel decisions holding Maryland and West Virginia laws preempted. The state laws require drug manufacturers participating in the Medicaid 340B drug-rebate program to further discount their drugs to sell to contract pharmacies in the States. There is a circuit split over similar state laws.
MootnessMunsingwear New Mexico Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2026 WL 1590859 (10th Cir. June 3, 2026). The Tenth Circuit (Tymkovich, Bacharach, Federico), in a per curiam order and judgment, dismissed as moot cattle growers’ appeal of a district-court order dismissing their challenge to the Forest Service’s authorization of lethal methods to remove feral Gila cattle. The Service’s removal operations had concluded and—while the case was on appeal—the Service withdrew the challenged memo and issued new guidance prohibiting the use of lethal removal methods for Gila cattle. Even though there is a dispute over whether any Gila cattle remain, there is no reasonable expectation that the Service will resume the challenged method, given the memo. And the agency’s action seems genuine, because the withdrawal followed a district-court victory. Similarly, the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception doesn’t apply because any future Gila cattle removal would be by a different method. Munsingwear vacatur is appropriate because the prevailing party took unilateral action to moot the case.
Stays Rojas-Espinoza v. Blanche, 2026 WL 1663007 (9th Cir. June 9, 2026). The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated a prior order denying a motion to stay immigration removal (see Issue 26.4), granted such a stay, and ordered supplemental briefing. In light of en banc briefing and oral argument, it was apparent that the petitioners met the ordinary stay factors. Judge Wardlaw concurred, reasoning that the case laid bare the dangers of denying motions to stay removal before a panel has the opportunity to review the record and criticizing the truncated process the panel had proposed. Judge Lee, joined by Juge Bade, dissented, reasoning that Petitioners had not made a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits. Judge Tung also dissented, reiterating a prior statement and criticizing the court for violating Nken twice in a single case: first by granting a prolonged stay without considering the merits, and then when it denied the stay to mask the circuit’s unlawful stay practice.
District Courts
Recent Notable Decisions
APAArticle IIIStanding Oregon Env’tl Council v. Internal Revenue Serv., 2026 WL 1631612 (D.D.C. June 6, 2026). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Kollar-Kotelly) vacated an Internal Revenue Service notice that affected the availability of wind and solar energy project tax credits and remanded to the IRS. All but one of the plaintiffs had standing, for example associational standing based on nonspeculative injuries in the former of higher electricity rates. The Maryland Office of People’s Counsel lacked standing because it asserted the rights of Maryland ratepayers, and a precedential prudential rule bars states from using parens patriae standing to sue the federal government. The Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. And on the merits, the agency’s action, among other things, failed to explain a significant change in position.
APAPreliminary Injunctions Oregon-California Trails Ass’n v. Hogan, 2026 WL 1649573 (D. Colo. June 8, 2026). The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado (Wang) granted a preliminary injunction, conditioned on a $5,000 bond, that enjoins construction of the R-Project, a transmission line across Nebraska. The plaintiff groups were not likely to succeed on the claim that Executive Order 14156 (declaring a national energy emergency) did not trigger the alternative compliance provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act. But they were likely to succeed on their claim that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service did not adequately explain why the project met those alternative provisions.
APARemedies National Parks Conservation Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 2026 WL 1706963 (D. Mass. June 12, 2026). The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (Kelley) granted a stay under Section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act in a challenge to the National Parks Service’s removal of certain signage and exhibits from national parks. The plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their arbitrary and capricious claims. Among other things, “[a] unilateral, unreasoned, and lawless Executive Order . . . cannot be the sole justification for an agency’s actions.” The plaintiffs were also likely to succeed on their claim that the removal was contrary to law because it violated, among other requirements, the Centennial Act’s directive to ensure the “highest quality interpretation and education.” Contrary to the defendants’ arguments, a Section 705 remedy was available in lieu of a preliminary injunction.
Recent Notable Filing
Article IICitizen Suits NAACP v. xAI, No. 3:26-cv-00074-DMB-JMV (N.D. Miss. June 15, 2026). The U.S. Department of Justice filed a motion to intervene and to dismiss a suit the NAACP brought to require xAI to comply with the Clean Air Act’s requirements under the Act’s citizen suit provisions. The government argues, among other things, that it must have the ability to intervene and unilaterally dismiss a citizen suit to avoid Article II concerns that the statute would otherwise present.
State Courts
Recent Notable Decision
Subject Matter Jurisdiction State v. City of McAllen, 2026 WL 1614384 (Tex. June 5, 2026). The Supreme Court of Texas, in an opinion by Chief Justice Blacklock, held that the Texas courts lacked jurisdiction over cities’ challenge to a state law that reduced the fees cities can charge to telecommunications companies. The cities named the State of Texas as a defendant, but a plaintiff who sues an allegedly unconstitutional law must “identify and name the officer or agency with authority to enforce the challenged law.”
Articles, Events & Other Items of Interest
- Erika Kranz, A Department Untethered: The Erosion of DOJ Settlement Norms and Implications for Environmental Law (Harvard EELP, June 2026).
- Jonathan Klick, You Can’t Tax the Past Without Pricing The Present: The Hidden Costs of Climate Superfund Laws (SSRN, Posted May 30, 2026).
- Jack Jones, Fixing the Boundaries of Federal Agencies’ Discretionary Authority (IPI, June 4, 2026).
- Eyal Lurie Pardes, Temporary Rules (Regulatory Review, June 16, 2026).
- Adam Feldman, How Supreme Court Precedents Die Before They Are Overruled (SCOTUSblog, June 16, 2026).
Earthjustice’s Strategic Legal Advocacy team identifies and addresses cross-cutting changes in judicial doctrines that affect our clients’ ability to vindicate their rights. These include legal doctrines affecting justiciability, jurisdiction, the scope of federal power, and judicial review of agency actions.
Photo at top: Brachygenys chrysargyrea swim among elkhorn coral. Once a dominant reef-building coral in the Caribbean Sea, elkhorn coral are now perilously close to extinction. (Ethan Daniels / Shutterstock)