What to Expect at Oral Argument in Monsanto Company v. Durnell

On April 27, 2026, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Monsanto Company v. Durnell.

• Listen to the argument, beginning at 11:00 a.m. ET.
• If you can’t tune in at the exact time, you can listen to a recording of the argument.

The Court took the case to decide whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempts state failure-to-warn claims where the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has not required the warning. The case is one of thousands brought by people who got non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma after applying Monsanto’s Roundup.

But the case has significance beyond Roundup. It could bar all lawsuits against companies who fail to warn people of known dangers of their pesticide products. People who are harmed would have no avenue for obtaining damages to cover their medical expenses and lost wages.

Earthjustice has a long history of going to court to protect farmworkers, families, and communities from the harms pesticides can cause, including fighting for stronger safeguards and accountability when dangerous products put people at risk. Listen to a podcast episode about the case with the Environmental Law Institute.

Durnell Argues FIFRA’s Preemption Provision Allows States to Impose Liability for Inadequate Warnings and Directions

FIFRA expressly preserves state authority to regulate pesticide use. This means a state can ban a pesticide altogether or require personal protective equipment (PPE) or no-spray buffers around schools. States cannot, however, impose any “requirements for labeling … in addition to or different from” those required under FIFRA. This provision is at the heart of the case.

In 2005, the Supreme Court held in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), that states can impose “requirements” through common law failure to warn claims, as long as the state common law is the functional equivalent of FIFRA’s misbranding standard, which requires adequate warnings and directions to protect public health. Drawing on Bates, Durnell argues states can impose liability for failing to have adequate warnings and directions.

Monsanto Claims FIFRA Prohibits Any Warnings Missing from the Label

Monsanto claims the label is the preemptive “requirement” and that states cannot impose any warnings or directions different from what is on the label EPA approved when it registered the pesticide. Under this reading, no state failure to warn claims would survive.

In 2022, a court of appeals vacated EPA’s cancer finding for glyphosate, Roundup’s active ingredient, because EPA had discounted studies that correlated glyphosate exposures with cancer. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 38 F.4th 34 (9th Cir. 2022). Durnell and friend-of-the-court briefs on its side (amici) argue that vacatur eliminated any basis for the label to preempt a state-law obligation to provide a cancer warning.

The United States has flipflopped on whether FIFRA preempts failure to warn claims as administrations have changed. While EPA now supports Monsanto, it concedes that “a pesticide might be misbranded for reasons outside the scope of what EPA assesses during the registration process.” A farmworker friend-of-the-court brief describes many label deficiencies that stem from harms, like cancer risks from the formulated product, that EPA fails to assess during registration. Farmworker Justice, et al. filed. (Distributed)

EPA’s Approval of Pesticide Labels is No Defense to Misbranding

Manufacturers draft pesticide labels and have ongoing duty to submit to EPA information that may show adverse effects from their pesticides. Misbranded labels that lack adequate warnings and directions for use are prohibited under FIFRA. And FIFRA contains a unique provision stating that EPA’s registration of the pesticide is not a defense to any violation of FIFRA. In Bates, the Supreme Court read this provision to mean a pesticide can be both registered and misbranded.

Loper-Bright

Durnell invokes and Monsanto contests the role of Loper-Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which overruled deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms in the absence of a specific delegation of regulatory authority. Durnell argues that FIFRA delegates no regulatory authority to EPA to interpret FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition to the exclusion of state juries.

Monsanto argues that EPA’s registration of a pesticide precludes misbranding claims because EPA must find the manufacturer label complies with FIFRA as part of the registration. Monsanto repeatedly recites the mantra, “the label is the law,” but that phrase refers to the fact that pesticide users must comply with label directions. The label lacks the force of law that promulgated regulations have.

Two FIFRA regulations will likely loom large at argument.

1. “Danger” v. “Caution”

EPA regulations establish an acute toxicity classification scheme, which prescribes label precautionary statements corresponding to the pesticide’s classification. Citing this regulation in Bates, the Supreme Court indicated that a state could not require use of the term “danger” when the regulation directed use of the less severe term “caution.”

Monsanto points to the regulation to argue it could not add a cancer warning to its labels. But EPA has promulgated no analogous regulations setting out when and how cancer warnings should be conveyed. Former EPA Officials and Environmental Protection Network submitted. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Monsanto Company v. Hardeman, No. 21-241 (U.S. May 14, 2021, cert. denied).

2. Label Approval Regulation

FIFRA directs EPA to amend registrations when the manufacturer changes its pesticide label as long as the change will not violate FIFRA. By regulation, EPA allows some label changes to be made by the manufacturer unilaterally, but it leaves the situations where this can occur to EPA policies, not regulations.

Monsanto argues that it would be impossible for it to provide cancer warnings unilaterally because of EPA’s gatekeeper role. Monsanto points to an informal letter (subsequently rescinded) that indicated EPA would not accept certain cancer warnings for glyphosate products. To counter, Durnell and its amici point to cancer warnings allowed without EPA approval. The back-and-forth illustrates how Monsanto’s preemption theory could hinge on EPA’s whims.